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Abstract
This Comment analyzes Japan’s effort to create a competitive securities market that is free,
transparent, and reliable. Part I describes Japan’s regulatory environment, emphasizing the power
and authority of the Ministry and its influence within the Japanese government and over the secu-
rities industry. Part II details elements of the Big Bang reforms and describes the current political
situation that will influence the effectiveness of the reforms. Part III addresses the probable effec-
tiveness of the reforms in the context of Japan’s regulatory structure, past scandals and reforms,
and current political environment. Finally, this Comment argues that the Ministry has the ability
to control the reformation of the securities industry because of the Ministry’s extensive influence
within the government and over the securities industry. In addition, this Comment argues that
the reforms initiated by the Japanese government will be ineffective in changing the regulation
of the securities industry because the reforms threaten to reduce the Ministry’s authority over the
securities industry.
MASTER OF PUPPETS: HOW JAPAN'S MINISTRY OF
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Scandals in Japan have long been a way for the public to feel
a catharsis even if little actually changes.'
INTRODUCTION
The Ministry of Finance 2 ("Ministry") regulates Japan's se-
curities markets3 in an informal manner, using strong persua-
sion to supplant the use of legislation.4 The key to this informal
method of regulation is keeping the number of securities com-
panies5 low, while simultaneously prodding these companies
into action by using incentives and implied threats.6 Under the
* J.D. Candidate, 1999, Fordham University. This Comment is dedicated to my
parents for all of their love and support.
1. See Peter Landers, Limited Exposure: Scandal Shakes Japan Inc. But Doesn't Speed
Reform, FAR E. ECON. REv., Feb. 12, 1988, at 62 (reporting bribery scandal involving
Ministry of Finance ("Ministry") officials).
2. See ROBERT C. Hsu, THE MIT ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE JAPANESE ECONOMY 336
(1994) (providing synopsis of Ministry). The Japanese Government established the
Ministry in 1870 and it is the most elitist and the most powerful of all ministries in
Japan. Id. The Ministry has the highest budget and the largest staff of all ministries.
Id.
3. See id. at 236 (defining Japanese securities markets as consisting of primary mar-
ket for new issues and secondary market for stock trading). The primary market con-
cerns raising corporate funds through issuing shares of the company. Id. The secon-
dary market consists of trading on the stock exchanges and over-the-counter trading in
the offices of securities companies. Id.
4. SeeJOHN OWEN HALEY, AUTHORITY WITHOUT POWER: LAW AND THE JAPANESE PAR-
ADOx 163 (1991) (outlining administrative guidance as informal means of governmen-
tal persuasion); ELLIOT J. HAHN, JAPANESE BUSINESS LAW AND THE LECAL SYSTEM 113
(1984) (detailing significant feature of administrative guidance as minimal statutory
authorization); see also C. Jeffrey Char, ReformingJapan's Securities Markets: The Loss Com-
pensation Scandal, 10 INT'L TAx & Bus. LAw. 173, 190 (1993) (describing informal regu-
lation ofJapanese securities market); Ken Duck, Now That the Fog Has Lifted: The Impact
ofJapan's Administrative Procedures Law on the Regulation of Industry and Market Governance,
19 FoRnDiAm INT'L L.J. 1686, 1687 (1996) (designating administrative guidance as pro-
cess using implied threats of action or inaction to effect compliance with administrative
goal).
5. See Hsu, supra note 2, at 308 (explaining that securities companies were estab-
lished in accordance with Securities and Exchange Law of 1948 ("SEL") for underwrit-
ing and trading of securities).
6. See Curtis J. Milhaupt, Managing the Market: The Ministry of Finance and Securities
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guidance of the Ministry, Japan's financial systems flourished.7
Indeed, the informal regulation helped to propel the Tokyo
stock market, the Nikkei, to become one of the world's premier
markets.8
This type of regulation, however, created an environment
that led to numerous scandals in Japan over the past ten years.9
The scandals sparked criticism from both the Japanese public1 °
and the international community." The scandals also sparked a
cycle of reforms to the Japanese Securities and Exchange Law12
("SEL") and the Ministry. Despite these reforms, however, scan-
Regulation in Japan, 30 STAN. J. INT'L L., 423, 451-52 (1994) (describing that reason
behind Ministry keeping number of securities companies low is to maintain better con-
trol); see also HAHN, supra note 4, at 114-15 (elaborating on Ministry's use of threats and
incentives); Duck, supra note 4, at 1687 (discussing administrative guidance).
7. See Barbara Wanner, Financial Scandals Renew Focus on Bureaucratic Power, JEI RE-
PORT, Mar. 6, 1998, at 5 (explaining experts' belief that Ministry's method of regulation
is reason forJapan's growth from 1950s through 1970s); see also Jon Choy, Japan's Finan-
cial Market Big Bang: The First Shock Waves, JEI REPORT, June 12, 1998, at 1 (describing
post World War II financial system as contributing significantly to Japan's rapid eco-
nomic expansion).
8. See TAKEJI YAMASHITA, JAPAN'S SECURITIES MARKETS: A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE 1
(1989) (describing strength of Japan securities markets in late 1980s by explaining that
at its height, in 1989, the trading volume for Japan's equity markets was 328.3 billion
shares).
9. See Choy, supra note 7, at 3 (describing how informal contacts and collusion
between Ministry and securities companies disadvantages Japan when questionable ac-
tivities are allowed); see also Shen-Shin Lu, Securities Regulation in Japan: An Update, 22
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'V 121, 150 (1993) (explaining circumstances of Recruit scandal
of 1988); Wanner, supra note 7, at I (detailing 1998 scandal involving banks bribing
Ministry officials).
10. SeeJONATHAN ISAACS & TAKASHI EJIRI, JAPANESE SECURITIES MARKET 138 (1990)
(noting that Recruit Scandal festered in Japanese and international press for over one
year); see also id. at 135 (mentioning outcry that occurred after Tateho Scandal came to
light); Milhaupt, supra note 6, at 466 (establishing public's outcry after Loss Compensa-
tion scandal and demand for independent securities regulator); Wanner, supra note 7,
at 8 (reporting public's anger at having to pay billions of dollars after failure of seven
housing loan associations). The public was especially upset because the Ministry admit-
ted that it had known the loan associations were in trouble for years but did nothing
about it. Wanner, supra.
11. See E.B. Keehn, Virtual Reality in Japan's Regulatory Agencies, inJAPAN: ECONOMIC
SUCCESS AND LEGAL SYSTEM 321 (Harald Baum ed., 1997) (describing international con-
demnation of regulatory style after Loss Compensation scandal in 1991); see also Gillian
Tett, Japan to Scale Back Probes into Financial Institutions Corruption, FIN. TIMES, May 25,
1998, at 18 (reporting Western investors' dissatisfaction with Japanese governments'
failure to overhaul its system for regulating financial institutions after MoF-Tan scan-
dal).
12. Shoken Torihiki Ho [Securities and Exchange Law], Law No. 25 of 1948 [here-
inafter SEL].
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dais continued to occur in the Japanese securities market.' 3
In a further effort to address its market problems, the Japa-
nese government recently made its boldest step in a long process
of reform toward creating a free, 4 fair,15 and global1 6 market
(the "Big Bang")."7 The planned reforms represent the govern-
ment's philosophical shift in regulating the securities industry.1 8
As part of the Big Bang, the Japanese government intends to
restructure its securities regulation from a process based on in-
formal regulation and protectionism to one based on oversight
and market competition.' 9
This Comment analyzes Japan's effort to create a competi-
tive securities market that is free, transparent, and reliable. Part
I describes Japan's regulatory environment, emphasizing the
power and authority of the Ministry and its influence within the
Japanese government and over the securities industry. Part II
details elements of the Big Bang reforms and describes the cur-
rent political situation that will influence the effectiveness of the
reforms. Part III addresses the probable effectiveness of the re-
forms in the context of Japan's regulatory structure, past scan-
dals and reforms, and current political environment. Finally,
this Comment argues that the Ministry has the ability to control
the reformation of the securities industry because of the Minis-
try's extensive influence within the government and over the se-
curities industry. In addition, this Comment argues that the re-
forms initiated by the Japanese government will be ineffective in
changing the regulation of the securities industry because the
13. See Edward J. Lincoln, Japan's Economic Mess, JEI REPORT, May 8, 1998, at 14
(stating that although deregulation and structural change occurred in Japan from mid
1970s to mid 1990s, there was little fundamental reform).
14. See Ministry of Finance, Structural Reform of theJapanese Financial Market: Toward
the Revival of the Tokyo Market by the Year 2001 (visited Mar. 16, 1998) <http.//
www.mof.go.jp/english/big-bang/ebb7.htm> (on file with the Fordham International Law
Journal) [hereinafter Structural Reform] (defining free as "liberaliz[ing] entry, products,
prices, etc.").
15. See id. (defining fair as "clarify[ing] and enhanc[ing] transparency of rules and
to protect investors interest").
16. See id. (defining global as "establishing a legal system, accounting system, and
supervisory regime consistent with globalization").
17. Id.
18. See Choy, supra note 7, at 1-7 (describing traditional system of regulation by
Ministry and proposed reforms).
19. See id. (arguing that informal regulation and protectionism by Ministry is weak-
ness of economy and detailing reform proposals).
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reforms threaten to reduce the Ministry's authority over the se-
curities industry.
I. REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT IN JAPAN'S SECURITIES
INDUSTRY PRIOR TO THE BIG BANG
Three interconnected factors define the regulatory environ-
ment in Japan's securities industry.2 The dominant factor of
the Japanese securities industry is the Ministry. 2 Another im-
portant element of securities regulation is the SEL. 2 A final
contributing factor in shaping Japan's regulatory environment
involves the scandals caused by the Ministry and securities com-
panies and the reforms that followed the scandals.23
A. Ministry of Finance
The Ministry's extensive reach throughout all aspects of se-
curities regulation makes it the dominant factor in shaping Ja-
pan's securities industry.24 The basis for the Ministry's influence
is its broad authority within the Japanese government.2 5 The
Ministry also retains extensive power over the securities industry
because of its pervasive method of regulation.26  Additionally,
the Ministry's close ties with the securities companies further
20. See Tomoko Akashi, Regulation of Insider Trading in Japan, 89 COLUM. L. REv.
1296, 1297 (1989) (discussing adoption of SEL in 1948, Ministry's use of SEL, and ef-
fect of scandals and reforms on Ministry and SEL in analysis of regulation of insider
trading in Japan).
21. See Clifford Chance, Japan, in INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES LAw 189 (1996) (stat-
ing that "[r]eal supervisory power over the Japanese financial system resides with the
[Ministry]").
22. See Hideki Kanda, Finance Bureaucracy and the Regulation of Financial Markets in
Japan, in JAPAN: ECONOMIC SUCCESS AND LEGAL SYSTEM 306 (Harald Baum ed., 1997)
(stating that "[t]he fundamental statute for the regulation of capital markets in Japan is
the Securities and Exchange Law.").
23. See Shen-Shin Lu, supra note 9, at 127-52 (detailing scandals and reforms that
shaped securities regulation in Japan).
24. See Milhaupt, supra note 6, at 444 (stating that Ministry is "perceived, both by
itself and by the public, as the nation's most elite civil service, as guardian of the na-
tion's economic health, and as breeding ground of prime ministers, in short as the
pinnacle of the Japanese state").
25. See id. (stating that "[t]he sweeping range of [Ministry's] jurisdiction assures
the centrality of its role in the Japanese bureaucracy").
26. See Michael K. Young, Judicial Review of Administrative Guidance: Governmentally
Encouraged ConsensualDispute Resolution in Japan, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 923 (1984) (describ-
ing benefits to Ministry in using administrative guidance).
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add to its broad authority over the securities industry.2 7
1. Broad Authority Within the Japanese Government
The Ministry's power within the Japanese government be-
gan at the Ministry's inception and grew over the years.28 The
Ministry's original power base derived from its responsibility for
the collection of taxes.2 9 This power slowly grew into complete
responsibility over many aspects of the Japanese government's
financial operations.3 °
a. Historical
The Japanese government founded the Ministry in 1869, af-
ter the collapse of its feudal system, as a tax gathering organiza-
tion. 1 In the 1930s, the Ministry's authority over the Japanese
economy expanded from the collection of taxes to the regula-
tion of the Japanese financial system.3 2 This authority expanded
further after World War II with the dismantling of other more
powerful forces of Japan. 3
During World War 11 the military controlled Japan.3 4 After
the Allied victory over Japan, the Allied Occupational Force 35
dismantled the military and Home Ministry, thereby leaving a
36power vacuum.- In addition, the Allied forces dismantled the
27. See PETER HARTCHER, THE MINISTRY: How JAPAN's MOST POWERFUL INSTITU-
TION ENDANGERS WORLD MARKETS 8-30 (1998) (describing importance to Ministry of
close ties with industry in guiding securities industry).
28. See Eamonn Fingleton, Japan's Invisible Leviathan, FOREIGN ArE., Mar.-Apr.
1995, at 72 (outlining origin of Ministry as tax. collector for Japanese Government and
expansion to current powers within government as overseeing Japan's financial health).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. See id. (describing Ministry as Japan's oldest surviving power center). From
inception, the Ministry gained power through its members. Id. For example, four of its
first recruits became four of the oligarchs who dominated Japan over the next 50 years
as Prime Ministers and business leaders. Id.
32. See id. (stating that powerful Japanese military gave Ministry power over Japa-
nese financial system to direct large amounts of capital into munitions industries).
33. See id. (describing evolution of Ministry during World War II caused by a power
vacuum after military and Home Ministry were dismantled).
34. See id. (setting forth structure of Japanese governance during World War II as
controlled by Japanese military and Home Ministry).
35. See KENNETH L. PORT, COMPARATIVE LAW: LAW AND THE LEGAL PROCESS IN JAPAN
636 (1996) (explaining that World War II ended in 1945 with Japan signing of Potsdam
Declaration, at which time Japan came under the control of Allied Occupying Force).
36. See id. (explaining change in governance of Japan after World War II when
Ministry adopted power after military and Home Ministry were dismantled).
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zaibatsu,37  another powerful economic force in Japan."
Zaibatsu were huge holding companies that dominated the Japa-
nese economy and were run by the capitalist class. 9 With the
powerful military, Home Ministry, and capitalist class in disarray,
the Ministry filled the void.4"
b. Structural
Currently, the Ministry's authority extends far beyond mere
tax collection to include many aspects of the Japanese govern-
ment.41 Central to the Ministry's power within the Government
is the Budget Bureau,4 2 which is responsible for compiling the
National Budget.4 Responsibility over the budget gives the Min-
istry power because the system forces all other agencies to nego-
tiate with the Ministry for their share of the budget.44 Budget
responsibility also gives the Ministry power because the Ministry
has the ability to effect the behavior of Japan's National Diet45
37. See Hsu, supra note 2, at 405 (defining zaibatsu as number of various affiliated
companies that were controlled by one holding company and that typically maintained
close cooperation).
38. See Milhaupt, supra note 6, at 433-36 (describing redistribution of zaibatsu
shareholdings to public in effort to dissolve zaibatsu).
39. Fingleton, supra note 28, at 72.
40. See id. (explaining that Allied Forces dismantling of military, Home Ministry,
and zaibatsu acted as catalyst to Ministry's obtaining present day powers).
41. See Duck, supra note 4, at 1714-15 (noting that budget power, along with tax
and monetary power, give Ministry central position in Japanese bureaucracy).
42. See ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT BUREAU, MANAGEMENT AND COORDINATION
AGENCY, PRIME MINISTER'S OFFICE, ORGANIZATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OFJAPAN 1997 54
(1997) (discussing authority of Budget Bureau ("BB") as responsible for investigating,
planning, drafting, and consolidating budget).
43. See Duck, supra note 4, at 1714-15 (describing power of Ministry derived from
budget responsibilities); see also Fingleton, supra note 28, at 70 (setting forth that Diet
has no substantive budget power and merely approves Ministry's budget).
44. See Duck, supra note 4, at 1714-15 (examining Ministry's power over otherJapa-
nese agencies because of budgetary power); see also STEPHEN BRONTE, JAPANESE FINANCE:
MARKETS AND INSTITUTIONS 132 (1982) (explaining Ministry's process for creating
budget for other ministries). Officials of the various agencies spend five months negoti-
ating with the Ministry for budget allotments. Id. The Ministry bases budget decisions
on political as well as economic justifications. Id. The Ministry is likely to give a greater
budgetary allotment to those other agencies that have a strong minister and that can
mobilize support from the electorate. Id.
45. See ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT BUREAU, supra note 42, at 2 (discussing role
of Diet in Japanese government as legislative branch of Japanese government that is
composed of House of Representatives and House of Counsilors); see also Michael K.
Young & Constance C.H. Jameson, Introduction to Japanese Law, in JAPAN BUSINESS LAw
GUIDE (CCH) 2604 (M. Matsushita et al. eds., 1991) (describing derivation of present
Diet from Imperial Diet established by Meiji Constitution in 1890). The Imperial Diet
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("Diet") and Prime Minister by threatening to withhold comple-
tion of the budget.46
The Ministry also has responsibility over the National Tax
Administration Agency,47 the Financial Bureau,4" the Interna-
had limited power. Id. The Emperor retained all authority to propose and to draft
legislation. Id. During the Taisho Era (1912-1926), the Diet's power increased as the
Diet formalized and democratized its procedures. Id. The Diet, however, was unable to
control the budget or to provide other meaningful checks on the exercise of executive
power. Id. By the 1930s, the military and bureaucracy controlled Japan. Id. The mili-
tary and bureaucracy were beyond any control of the Diet because they both had direct
access to the Emperor. Id. In 1946, the Allied Forces implemented a Constitution that
transformed the Imperial Diet into the National Diet. Id. The Japanese Constitution
designates the National Diet as the highest organ of state power and the sole lawmaking
organ of the state. Id.
46. See HARTCHER, supra note 27, at 205-208 (illustrating Ministry's power in Japan
by detailing its ability to affect Prime Ministry through control over budget). In 1993,
the Japanese people elected Prime Minister Hosokawa based on a platform of political
reform and economic deregulation. Id. at 205. The new government espoused a big-
ger role for the marketplace and a lesser one for regulations. Id. Similarly, the govern-
ment wanted a larger role for politicians over bureaucrats. Id. Hosokawa failed to ful-
fill this platform, however, because he left office in 1994. Id. at 205-207.
Hosokawa resigned as a result of proposing an unpopular increase in the consump-
tion tax from three percent to seven percent. Id. The increase came at the insistence
of the Ministry a year earlier. Id. at 205. Hosokawa took office with a promise to de-
crease taxes to assist an economy in the midst of a recession. Id. The Ministry agreed
to the tax cut, but only if Hosokawa would include, in the same legislation, an increase
in the consumption tax for the next year. Id. When Hosokawa initially refused to cre-
ate legislation that included an increase in the consumption tax, the Ministry blocked
the efforts to compile the national budget. Id. at 206. Ultimately, the Ministry won. Id.
On February 3, 1994, Hosokawa announced that the tax cut would be followed by a tax
increase. Id. at 207. The political uproar that followed the proposed tax increase was
fatal to the credibility and popularity of the Hosokawa government. Id.
47. See ADMINISTRATIVE MANAGEMENT BUREAU, supra note 42, at 54-57 (setting forth
role of National Tax Administration Agency ("NTAA") in Japanese government as re-
sponsible for assessment and collection of national tax). The NTAA investigates and
inspects income and other tax bases and exposure of large scale tax evasion. Id. The
NTAA also controls most aspects of liquor production and sale. Id.
48. See id. at 55 (discussing role of Financial Bureau ("FB") in Japanese govern-
ment as coordinating treasury, public finance and monetary system, domestic finance,
and international finance). The FB also researches, plans, and drafts the treasury sys-
tem, the government debt system, the currency system, and the national property sys-
tem. Id. In addition, this bureau adjusts the receipts and payments of treasury funds
and the issue, redemption, and interest payment of government bonds. Id. Moreover,
the FB controls and operates the Trust Fund Bureau Fund and controls of the Indus-
trial Investment Special Account. Id. Furthermore, this bureau compiles the Fiscal In-
vestment and Loan Program and also matters concerning loans to local governments.
Id. The FB has general control over national property, management and disposal of
non-administrative property, construction, maintenance, and management of housing
for government officials. Id. Additionally, this bureau investigates, plans, and drafts
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tional Finance Bureau,4 9 the Insurance Department,50 the Tax
Bureau,5 the Customs and Tariffs Bureau,5 2 the Minister's Sec-
retariat,53 the Banking Bureau,54 and the Securities Bureau.55
To form a comparable authority in the U.S. system of administra-
tive governance, the Department of Treasury,56 the Office of
Management and Budget,57 the Securities and Exchange Com-
the monopoly system and tobacco industries system and supervision over Japan To-
bacco Inc. Id.
49. See id. at 56 (explaining role of Japan's International Finance Bureau ("IFB")
as researching and planning international finance, foreign exchange, and matters con-
cerning the adjustment of payment balances). The IFB manages the Foreign Exchange
Fund, Foreign Exchange Special Account, foreign exchange rates, and control of for-
eign exchange transactions. Id. The IFB also authorizes and supervises foreign ex-
change banks and money changers. Id. The IFB controls foreign aid, overseas private
investment, and inflow of foreign capital. Id. Additionally, the IFB controls the keep-
ing of statistics on foreign exchange and the balance of payments. Id.
50. See id. at 15 (outlining structure of Ministry and showing that Insurance De-
partment is part of Banking Bureau).
51. See id. at 54 (detailing responsibilities of Tax Bureau ("TB") as researching,
planning, and drafting systems concerning taxes, including tax conventions between
Japan and other countries). The TB also investigates tax revenue estimates and actual
tax revenue. Id. In addition, the TB also plans and drafts systems for certified tax
accountants and the Liquor Business Associations. Id. Moreover, the TB controls reve-
nue of local public entities. Id.
52. See id. at 55 (describing duties of Customs and Tariffs Bureau ("CTB") as re-
searching, planning, and drafting systems concerning customs duties and tonnage
dues). The Bureau also enforces export and import regulations for goods, vessels, air-
craft, and passengers. Id. Moreover, the Bureau investigates, plans, and drafts agree-
ments on customs and tariffs and researches foreign customs systems. Id. Furthermore,
the Bureau supervises and licenses customhouses and customs officers. Id.
53. See id. at 54 (assessing powers of Ministry's Secretariat ("MS") as Secretariat
assisting Minister and Vice Ministers in general administration of Ministry and acting as
liaison between different Bureaus to ensure efficient operation of government). The
MS also oversees important matters that fall outside the scope of the individual bureaus.
Id. In addition, the MS controls matters concerning secrecy, personnel changes, and
discipline. Id. Furthermore, the MS supervises matters concerning public information
and the Diet and manages the Local Finance Bureaus. Id.
54. See Financial Supervision Agency Begins Work, KYODO NEWS, June 22, 1998 [here-
inafter KYODo NEWS] (noting that Securities Bureau recently merged with Banking Bu-
reau to become Financial Planning Bureau after removal of investigatory duties of both
by Diet to form Financial Supervision Agency ("FSA")).
55. Id.
56. See BRUCE WETTERAU, DESK REFERENCE ON AMERICAN GOVERNMENT 94 (1995)
(detailing Department of Treasury's duties as managing federal government's monetary
resources, operating U.S. mints, regulating U.S. banks, collecting taxes and customs
duties, and overseeing Secret Service).
57. See id. at 27 (describing Office of Management and Budget's responsibilities as
assisting U.S. President in preparing annual budget request, reviewing all executive
branch proposals to Congress, and reviewing all legislation passed by Congress and sent
to President for signing).
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mission,5" and insurance regulatory agencies5" would have to
merge. 6 0 Because of this authority within the Japanese govern-
ment, the Ministry has been characterized as being unparalleled
in the industrialized world.61
2. Broad Authority over the Securities Industry
The Ministry's authority over the securities industry equals
its power within the Japanese government. 62 One major source
for this authority comes from the Ministry's ability to draft legis-
lation.6" Another important source is the Ministry's regulation
of the securities industry through administrative guidance.64
a. Legislative Drafting
A large part of the Ministry's authority over the securities
industry originates in its role as the drafter of legislation. 6 Ja-
pan's Constitution 6 6 gives the principal power to draft legislation
to the Diet.6' The bureaucrats of Japan's government actually
58. See Louis Loss, A Synopsis of Securities Regulation in the United States, in JAPANESE
SECURITIES REGULATION 4-5 (Louis Loss et al. eds., 1983) (discussing role of Securities
and Exchange Commission ("SEC") in U.S. Government as administrative body that is
responsible for securities regulation). The SEC regulates the securities markets
through enforcing statutes, adopting rules, and holding hearings. Id. The SEC is an
independent, multimember, bipartisan commission. Id. It has five Commissioners,
which are appointed by the President with consent of the Congress. Id.
59. See GLOSSARY OF INSURANCE TERMS 132 (Thomas E. Green ed., 1996) (establish-
ing that each state regulates insurance industry in that state and that regulatory agency
is headed by Insurance Commissioner).
60. See Char, supra note 4, at 188 (describing role of Ministry in governance of
Japan).
61. See HARTCHER, supra note 27, at 2 (stating that Ministry is "a political, eco-
nomic, and intellectual force without parallel in the developed world.").
62. See Chance, supra note 21, at 189 (describing broad supervisory authority over
Japanese financial system).
63. See George F. Parker, The Regulation of Insider Trading in Japan: Introducing a
Private Right of Action, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 1399, 1412 (1995) (stating that because Ministry
has power to draft legislation and to enforce legislation, it also has inherited power to
rule).
64. See Hsu, supra note 2, at 1 (defining administrative guidance as bureaucrats
implementing official policies by giving suggestions or unwritten orders to regulated
parties). Administrative guidance is based on the broad discretionary power of the bu-
reaucracy rather than specific laws. Id.
65. See supra note 63 and accompanying text (describing Ministry's power to draft
legislation).
66. KENPO. art. 41.
67. See Wanner, supra note 7, at 4 (examining legislative powers and authority in
Japanese government).
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draft the legislation, however, because of the lack of staff and
policy development resources in the Diet.68 In fact, bureaucrats
draft over ninety percent of all legislation enacted by the Diet.69
The Ministry's authority over legislative drafting reaches as
deep as the actual debates in the Diet regarding legislation
drafted by the Ministry.7 ° The bureaucrats usually script both
sides of the debate between the supporters of the bill and its
opponents.7 The responsibility of the bureaucrats in drafting
legislation is so broad that one bureaucrat has been quoted as
saying that the Diet is an extension of the bureaucracy.7 2
b. Administrative Guidance
The Ministry also retains pervasive authority over the securi-
ties industry by means of its practice of regulating through ad-
ministrative guidance.7" Administrative guidance is a process by
which the Ministry obtains voluntary cooperation from securities
companies through extra-legal means." Generally, the Ministry
68. See id. at 1, 4 (describing Diet's lack of participation in legislation drafting pro-
cess); see also The Japan Puzzle: Hurtling Towards Paralysis, ECONOMIST, Mar. 21, 1998, at
22 [hereinafter Japan Puzzle] (describing absence of input by Diet in legislation drafting
process). The bureaucracy is the only institution in Japan's government that is capable
of weighing competing ideas and formulating solutions. Id. Most of the legislation
created by the Japanese government starts at low levels at the various ministries and
works its way up through the ministries until it is ready for the Diet. Id. Once in the
Diet, bureaucrats are called to handle the tricky questions. Id. The minister of the
applicable Ministry is only involved to shepherd the bill through the Diet. Id. The role
of the cabinet is to coordinate the legislative agenda and to seek a consensus with other
political parties. Id. The Prime Minister has little real power. Id.
69. See Parker, supra note 63, at 1412 (detailing breadth of Ministry's ability to
draft legislation).
70. See Wanner, supra note 7, at 4 (setting forth argument that bureaucrats hold
ascendant position to lawmakers in Japan).
71. Id.
72. See id. (stating that Japan is government of administration, not laws).
73. See Young, supra note 26, at 923 (emphasizing various powers gained by minis-
tries when using administrative guidance).
74. See HALEY, supra note 4, at 163 (reviewing Ministry's system for regulating se-
curities industry). The Ministry often regulates the securities industry without direct
statutory authority and thus without following institutionalized laws. Id. Instead, the
Ministry acts through negotiation and compromise to gain consensus. Id. Through
gaining consensus, regulation by the Ministry also escapes adjudicatory law. Id. Specifi-
cally, Japan's court system is reluctant to review orders of the Ministry if the regulated
party consented to them. Id.; see also HAHN, supra note 4, at 118 (defining institutional
law as those that are created by political body and adjudicatory law as means by which
institutionalized laws are reviewed and as means by which non-legal rules are legiti-
mized).
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avoids invoking direct statutory authority to effect behavior.75
Instead, it uses provisions of the SEL as support for threats and
incentives to coerce the regulated parties to consent to the regu-
latory action.7 6 Administrative guidance allows the Ministry to
gain broader authority over the securities markets" and greater
flexibility in regulation.78
The Ministry's main support for threats and incentives de-
rives from the licensing provisions of the SEL.79 A financial cri-
sis in the securities industry precipitated the adoption of this li-
censing system."' By 1965, Japanese securities companies be-
came seriously overextended from excessive promotional
activities."' The collapse of the securities market in the same
year forced some companies into bankruptcy and left many
others in poor health.12 The Ministry was unable to prevent the
crisis through available legal tools.8 3 As a result, the Diet
amended the SEL to include the licensing requirement.84
The ability to license corporations provides the Ministry
with the ability to guide securities companies in a desired direc-
tion by implicitly threatening to suspend or revoke those licenses
if the companies do not consent to direction. 5 Similarly, the
75. HALEY, supra note 4, at 163.
76. See Milhaupt, supra note 6, at 450 (describing importance of licensing section
of SEL to Ministry's regulatory posture).
77. See Young, supra note 26, at 936 (stating that "[b]ecause the use of administra-
tive guidance frees an agency from the specific moorings of the governing statutory
language, it may not only expand the scope of its activity, but also redefine the very
nature of the regulatory mandate.").
78. See id. (examining advantages of Ministry's use of administrative guidance); see
also Duck, supra note 4, at 1708 (stating that "[t]he flexibility or extra-legal nature of
administrative guidance means that its exercise is not always constrained by any legal
limits").
79. See Milhaupt, supra note 6, at 450 (describing Ministry's use of licensing section
of SEL to regulate securities industry).
80. See id. at 449-50 (detailing adoption of licensing system in response to crisis in
securities industry).
81. See Christopher P. Wells & Haruko Yamamori, Securities & Banking Law, in JA-
PAN BUSINEss LAW GUIDE (CCH) 55,104 (M. Matsushita et al. eds., 1991) (examining
reasons for 1965 collapse of Japan's securities market).
82. See id. (noting effects of collapse of securities market in 1965).
83. See id. (discussing Ministry's inability to prevent 1965 market crisis because
legal tools of Ministry were inadequate to handle crisis at that time).
84. See id. (explaining Diet's reasons for amending SEL and effects of amend-
ments); see also Milhaupt, supra note 6, at 449-50 (detailing decline in securities compa-
nies after implementation of licensing system from 600 securities in 1962 to 277 in
1968).
85. SEL art. 35; see MisAo TATSUTA, SECURITIES REGULATION IN JAPAN 71 (1970)
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Ministry can direct securities firms by threatening to deny
licenses to engage in new lines of business, or by offering an
incentive of permission to develop a new product.8 6 Most securi-
ties companies follow administrative guidance because they
know that any future requests of the Ministry will depend on
their present behavior.8 7
Licensing is also an important part of administrative gui-
dance because licensing allows the Ministry to limit the number
of securities firms operating in the industry.88 With a limited
number of firms in operation, the Ministry monitors the industry
more easily.89 Moreover, the Ministry can engage in preventive
regulation by barring market entry to unqualified or unscrupu-
lous securities companies. 9° Thus, the Ministry has full control
over competition in the market because the Ministry controls
not only the products sold through licensing but also the
number of market participants. 9'
The Ministry benefits from regulating through administra-
tive guidance because there is little judicial review of the Minis-
(outlining elements of SEL Article 35). The Ministry may revoke or suspend a license if
the amount of stated capital of the securities company has decreased to below the statu-
tory minimum. Id. The Ministry may also revoke a license if the company has been
convicted of a fine pursuant to the SEL. Id. In addition, the Ministry may revoke a
license if the securities company has violated the law, an administrative order pursuant
to the law, or the qualification attached to the license. Id. Moreover, the Ministry may
revoke a license if the securities company is on the verge of insolvency and the revoca-
tion is indispensable to prevent further losses by investors. Id.
86. See Milhaupt, supra note 6, at 451 (examining Ministry's power over securities
companies through use of licensing provision of SEL); see also Hideki Kanda, Develop-
ments in Japanese Securities Regulation: An Overview, 29 INT'L LAW. 599, 609 (1995) (detail-
ing Ministry's authority over securities companies). Security companies are not allowed
to market any product that is not explicitly endorsed by the Ministry. Id.
87. See BRONTE, supra 44, at 130 (setting forth that companies that ignore adminis-
trative guidance risk future retribution by Ministry); see also Duck, supra note 4, at 1703-
04 (stating that "[r] ecipients of guidance, because of the need for close amicable rela-
tions with bureaucrats, generally do not challenge administrative guidance.").
88. See Milhaupt, supra note 6, at 451-52 (highlighting that reduced number of
securities companies to regulate is advantage to limiting grant of licenses).
89. See id. (noting ease of regulating securities industry when number of securities
companies is low).
90. See id. (noting further advantage to licensing system is preventing securities
firms that may potentially cause damage to industry and public from entering securities
industry); see also MOF Opposes Calls for Japanese SEC, Offers Merger of Investigation Bureaus,
INT'L SEC. REG. REp., July 29, 1991, at 2 (explaining that Ministry has stated that "it is
more efficient and preferable for us to stop malpractice before it happens.").
91. See Choy, supra note 7, at 2-3 (discussing absolute power of Ministry overJapa-
nese securities market).
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try's work.9 2 Administrative guidance generally does not change
the legal relationships of the parties receiving guidance.93 Japa-
nese courts, in fact, traditionally considered challenges to ad-
ministrative guidance to be non-justiciable. 4 Generally, the
court accepts the argument that the companies exercised volun-
tary compliance and therefor the plaintiffs had no claim for re-
lief.95 The non-judiciability of informal regulatory guidance
gives the Ministry almost absolute control over the regulatory
process when coupled with its ability to draft, interpret, and en-
force the laws.96
3. Extent of Reach Within Securities Companies
The Ministry's relationship with the securities companies is
another factor that facilitates its authority within the securities
industry.97 One aspect of this relationship is the Ministry's prac-
tice of disseminating information to the industry through a small
number of large firms.98 The Ministry also controls the securi-
ties companies by ensuring that the securities companies rely on
the Ministry for valuable information.99
92. See Young, supra note 26, at 933 (setting forth that "administrative guidance is
an act of factual and not legal character"). See generally Duck, supra note 4, at 1703-07
(oudining judicial role in administrative guidance regulatory structure).
93. See Young, supra note 26, at 933 (explaining that administrative guidance lacks
legal effect because legal relationship between Ministry and securities companies is not
changed by regulating through administrative guidance); see also Duck, supra note 4, at
1704 (stating that ministries do not act in way that creates legal rights when they exer-
cise their influence informally).
94. See Young, supra note 26, at 954 (notingJapanese courts' attitude that adminis-
trative guidance issues fall outside their domain); see also PORT, supra note 35, at 636
(explaining that administrative courts were separated from judicial courts because judi-
cial courts were established to adjudicate civil cases and had no power to deal in orders
by administrative agencies).
95. See Young, supra note 26, at 954 (discussing courts' traditional deference to
Ministry in matters of administrative guidance).
96. See id. at 936 (stating that "[a]dministrative guidance permits agencies to regu-
late not only beyond the limits of the law but also, on occasion, in direct contravention
of the law").
97. See Char, supra note 4, at 189-92 (describing Ministry's relationship with securi-
ties companies by outlining various practices involving intermingling of employees).
98. See Milhaupt, supra note 6, at 452 (detailing Ministry's use of four largest ("Big
Four") securities companies in regulating industry).
99. See Wanner, supra note 7, at 119 (explaining Ministry's method of controlling
securities companies by drafting vague legislation).
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a. Securities Companies
The Japanese securities industry is divided into three tiers
accounting collectively for 220 securities companies.' The first
tier dominates the securities industry and consists of three major
companies known as Nomura Securities,0 1 Daiwa Securities,10 2
and Nikko Securities.103 Before the failure of the fourth largest
security company, Yamaichi Securities, 10 4 in 1997, the industry
referred to the first tier as the Big Four.0 5 The Ministry uses the
first tier securities companies as a means of controlling the rest
of the industry.1 0 6 Regular meetings between the Ministry and
the first tier securities companies ensure that the Ministry's views
disseminate quickly. 10 7 The balance of the industry consists of
the second tier of securities companies, designated the "Middle
Ten" medium-size companies, 1°8 and the third tier of companies
consisting of the remaining smaller companies. 0 9
b. Relationship Between the Ministry and the Securities
Companies
The Ministry's interaction with securities companies is ex-
emplified by a couple different practices." 0 One practice in-
volves the Ministry placing former Japanese government bureau-
100. SeeJONATHAN ISAACS, JAPANESE EQUITIES MARKETS 111 (1990) (describing gen-
erally structure of securities industry in Japan).
101. See id. at 112 (stating that Nomura Securities was founded in 1925 as offshoot
of bond trading department of Daiwa Bank and is premier securities firm in Japan).
102. See id. at 114 (detailing that Daiwa Securities was established in 1902 as part of
Fujimoto Bill Broker company and is second largest securities firm in Japan).
103. See id. at 115 (explaining that Nikko Securities is third largest securities com-
pany in Japan).
104. See David P. Hamilton & Bill Spindle, Market's Harsh Justice Staggers Yamaichi,
ASIAN WALL ST. J. Nov. 24, 1997 (discussing Yamaichi Securities opening in 1897 and
closing in November 1997).
105. See Char, supra note 4, at 179 (designating Big Four securities companies as
Nomura Securities, Daiwa Securities, Nikko Securities, and Yamaichi Securities).
106. See id. (explaining that structure of Japan's securities market aids its function-
ing because smaller securities companies look to larger securities companies for gui-
dance in operations).
107. See Milhaupt, supra note 6, at 453 (describing Big Four companies as Minis-
try's "foot soldiers" in its regulation of securities industry).
108. ISAACS, supra note 100, at 111.
109. Id.
110. See Duck, supra note 4, at 1696-1704 (outlining practices of amakudari and
MoF-Tan, and effect of practices on Japanese governments guidance of industry).
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crats into the private sector.11' A second practice involves the
securities companies placing employees in jobs at the Minis-
try. 1
1 2
i. Amakudari
Amakudari (literally - decent from heaven) is the process by
which the Ministry places retiring bureaucrats in executive posi-
tions in the securities industry.1 1 The Ministry uses the
amakudari system both to reward its bureaucrats for years of loy-
alty and hard work, and to give incentives to the junior bureau-
crats by making room for them at the top by retiring senior bu-
reaucrats into the private sector." 4 Whether the retiring bu-
reaucrat gets the job depends on the bureaucrat's ties with the
corporation and whether the bureaucrat has been sympathetic
to industry.1 15 One commentator defines amakudari as the pri-
mary tool and proof of complete economic guidance by the Jap-
anese bureaucracy." 6
ii. MoF-Tan
Another example of the close working relationship between
the Ministry and the securities companies involves a practice
known as MoF-Tan.117 The practice of MoF-Tan involves employ-
111. See HARTCHER, supra note 27, at 32-37 (detailing Ministry's practice of
amakudari as giving Ministry bureaucrats ability to enter private sector upon retirement
with strong assistance from Ministry).
112. See id. at 57 (introducing financial institutions practice of using MoF-Tans in
dealing with Ministry).
113. See Hsu, supra note 2, at 10 (elaborating on amakudari system as originated in
early Meiji period when government created industrial and commercial undertakings
for functionless samurai); see also Duck, supra note 4, at 1694 (explaining amakudari has
roots in Meiji Era where, familial ties and bonds of friendship formed at Japan's na-
tional universities). These ties resulted in influential positions being distributed to
friends and allies by those in power. Duck, supra.
114. See HARTCHER, supra note 27, at 33-34 (analyzing function of amakudari for
Ministry to retire employees into companies that Ministry regulates).
115. FRANK K. UPHAM, LAW AND SOCIAL CHANGE IN POSTWAR JAPAN 167 (1987); see
also Wanner, supra note 7, at 5 (explaining that Japan's National Public Service Law
precludes bureaucrats from working for firms that they once supervised for at least two
years). The National Public Agency can waive that requirement, however, if the bureau-
crat's ministry requests. Id. In 1997, 164 former officials from the Ministry held jobs as
executives or auditors at 128 financial firms. Id.
116. See CHALMERS JOHNSON, MITI AND THE JAPANESE MIRACLE: THE GROWrH OF
INDUSTRIAL POLICY 1925-75 (1982) (describing generally amakudari system as used by
Ministry of International Trade and Industry).
117. See HARTCHER, supra note 27, at 57 (explaining that MoF-Tan comes from
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ees of regulated banks and securities companies who maintain
offices within the Ministry to better facilitate the exchange of
information.' The Ministry deliberately drafts vague legislation
to gain more control over the regulatory process.11 9 As a result,
securities companies and other financial institutions send MoF-
Tans into the Ministry to determine what to do to comply with
the laws and regulations. 2 ° The Ministry benefits from this prac-
tice because, through the dialogue with the MoF-Tans, the Minis-
try develops a sense effective policies work more than others. 121
The securities companies benefit from this interaction because
they are able to participate in the policy-making process of the
Ministry.1 22  In addition, the securities companies can also
gather valuable information from the Ministry.123  The most
common type of information that the MoF-Tans will gather is the
date of Ministry inspections.
24
B. The Securities and Exchange Law
The SEL is a second major influence in the Japanese securi-
ties market. 25 The SEL's initial strength resulted directly from
MoF, which is English acronym for Ministry of Finance and tan, which is Japanese for
responsibility); see also Duck, supra note 4, at 1695-1703 (describing MoF-Tan system as
part of institutional arrangements that generate informal contact between Ministry and
business).
118. See Duck, supra note 4, at 1701 (stating that 'Japanese banks and securities
companies station permanent employees at [Ministry] to obtain information for [Minis-
try] bureaucrats.").
119. See Wanner, supra note 7, at 5 (discussing Ministry's power to draft legislation
in detailing extraordinary power wielded by Ministry).
120. See id. (describing Ministry's drafting of vague legislation as effort to maintain
power over securities companies).
121. See id. (discussing benefit of drafting vague legislation is gaining closer work-
ing relationship with securities companies).
122. See Duck, supra note 4, at 1701-02 (describing securities companies' ability to
participate in policymaking process of Ministry by having tans employed at Ministry).
123. See id. (detailing one reason that securities companies employ MoF-Tan is to
gather important information from Ministry such as inspection dates).
124. Id.; see Kazunari Yokota, Banks Vow to Change Ways amid Scandal, NIKKEI WKLv.,
Feb. 2, 1998, at 3 (quoting bank official as stating that "[w]e knew two or three months
ahead of time which month the inspectors would be coming"); see also IsAAcs & EjIR,
supra note 10, at 119-20 (setting forth that Article 55 of the SEL permits Ministry to
inspect business conditions, financial position, accounting books, documents and other
articles of securities companies if Minister deems it in public interest). The inspections
are structured either to uncover suspected malpractice or market abuses or to identify
basic and to correct basic problems in policy and operation. IsaAcs & EltRI, supra. The
inspections are usually used to enforce the Ministry's administrative guidance. Id.
125. See Ken Tsunematsu & Shuji Yanase,Japan, in INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES REc-
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the Allied Occupational Force following World War ll.126 Later
modifications to the SEL, however, reduced its importance in
shaping the Japanese securities markets.'
1. Original Securities and Exchange Law
Japan enacted the Securities and Exchange Law of 1948128
as a result of the Allied Occupation 2 9 following World War 11.1"
The Allied forces commissioned the Supreme Commander of Al-
lied Powers 3 ' ("SCAP") to supervise the Diet in creating a new
constitution and new laws based on those of the United States.1
32
The Diet's first attempt at a securities and exchange law failed
because SCAP did not find the attempt sufficiently comparable
ULATION 4 (Robert C. Rosen et al. eds, 1997) (stating that SEL is principle source of
securities regulation in Japan).
126. See Makoto Yazawa, A Synopsis of Securities Regulation in Japan, in JAPANESE SE-
CURITIES REGULATION 29 (Louis Loss et al. eds., 1983) (describing creation of SEL and
influence of Allied Occupational Force on SEL).
127. Id.
128. SEL, supra note 12.
129. See PORT, supra note 35, at 31 (examining effect of Allied Occupation on Ja-
pan's government following surrender of Japan in 1945 after World War II including
leadership of Allied Occupational Force by Supreme Commander of Allied Powers
("SCAP")).
130. SeeYazawa, supra note 126, at 29 (explaining role of "Occupation Authorities"
in implementing SEL as influencing Diet to enact securities laws based on securities laws
of United States).
131. See NISUKE ANDO, SURRENDER, OCCUPATION, AND PRIVATE PROPERTrY IN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW: AN EVALUATION OF U.S. PRACTICE IN JAPAN 9 (1991) (stating that on Au-
gust 14, 1945 U.S. President Truman secured consent of England, China, and Soviet
Union to designate U.S. General of Army Douglas MacArthur as Supreme Commander
of Allied Powers and authorized him to acceptJapan's surrender).
132. See PERCY R. LUNEY,JR. & KAZUtUKi TAKAHIAS-I, JAPANESE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
vii (1993) (discussing Allied Occupation ofJapan and consequent restructuring ofJapa-
nese government). The adoption of the Japanese Constitution, which was based on
that of the United States, signaled a radical departure from the traditional governance
of the Japanese people. Id. Japan replaced a system of governance based on the divin-
ity of the emperor with a system based on majority rule. Id. Generally, the Japanese
people adopted the new Constitution and the ideals of popular sovereignty and democ-
racy. Id. Remnants of old rule remain, however, in the first chapter of the Constitu-
tion, which provides for the survival of the emperor system. Id.
Remnants of the old rule are also pervasive in Japanese society. Id. at 31. One
example is the rule of the Liberal Democratic Party ("LDP") from 1955 to 1993. Id.
Although mechanisms were in place to change the rule of political parties, the popu-
lous did not take advantage of the mechanisms to change parties during this time pe-
riod. Id. Another example is the limited fight of the judiciary to protect civil liberties
compared to that of the U.S. judiciary. Id. The Japanese Bill of Rights remains an
important part of Japanese society, but is more pervasive in an extra-legal form. Id.
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to the U.S. system.' 33 This initial attempt included a separate
Securities and Exchange Commission but did not have a registra-
tion system for securities companies.'34 Instead, the Diet used
the same licensing system for stock exchanges and securities bro-
kers as it used before the war.'3 5 SCAP disapproved of this ver-
sion and urged the Japanese government to amend the law.' 36
As a result -of this pressure, the Diet enacted an SEL that was
modeled after the Securities Act of 1933137 ("1933 Act") and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ("1934 Act") of the United
States. "8
As adopted in 1948, the SEL mirrored the U.S. securities
laws. 139 The SEL included a provision for an independent regu-
latory board similar to the SEC of the United States.140 The law
also provided anti-fraud rules and disclosure requirements in the
primary and secondary markets.14 ' Moreover, the SEL imple-
mented a registration system for securities, broker-dealers, and
133. See Milhaupt, supra note 6, at 431 (1994) (detailing that initial version of SEL
failed to be approved by SCAP because of divergence with securities laws of United
States).
134. See Yazawa, supra note 126, at 29 (explaining that initial version of SEL in-
cluded licensing system in place of registration system).
135. See id. at 28 (discussing initiation of licensing requirement for broker dealers
and underwriters in 1938).
136. Id.
137. 15 U.S.C. § 77a-77aa (1991); see Loss, supra note 58, at 6 (summarizing Securi-
ties Act of 1933 ("1933 Act") as covering initial distribution of securities). The purpose
of the 1933 Act is to ensure full and accurate disclosure of the initial distribution. Id.
138. 15 U.S.C. § 781-7811 (1991); see Loss, supra note 58, at 7 (reviewing purpose
of Securities Act of 1934 ("1934 Act") as covering post-registration trading). One pur-
pose of the 1934 Act is to afford continual disclosure to people who trade in securities.
Id. Another purpose is to prevent and to afford remedies for fraudulent practices in
securities trading and manipulation of the markets. Id. In addition, Congress designed
the 1934 Act to regulate the markets and to control the amount of the nation's credit
that goes through those markets. Id.
139. See TATSUTA, supra note 85, at 10 (stating that in 1948, Diet enacted bill based
on memorandum supplied by occupation forces to amend Diet's original 1947 Securi-
ties and Exchange Law, copying main provisions of 1933 Act and 1934 Act). The SEL
also included provisions for the segregation of securities business from banking and
independent certified public accountants. Id. at 11.
140. See id. (summarizing elements of SEL as registration of securities, establish-
ment of independent securities regulator, registration of broker-dealers and securities
companies, segregation of securities business from banking, and independent certified
public accountants).
141. See Kanda, supra note 22, at 306 (stating that SEL provides mandatory disclo-
sure and anti-fraud rules); see also Char, supra note 4, at 176 (explaining that SEL gov-
erns both primary and secondary markets).
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securities exchanges.142
2. Modification of the Original SEL
In practice, the SEL proved ineffective compared to its U.S.
counterpart because of amendments made by the Japanese gov-
ernment and a lack of formal enforcement by the Ministry.'43
The Japanese government revised the original regulatory struc-
ture because it conflicted with the way the Japanese government
traditionally regulated its securities industry.'4 4 For example,
the Japanese government and the public generally tolerated cer-
tain types of insider trading as a way of doing business.14 5 More-
over, the Japanese government traditionally regulated the indus-
try through informal administrative guidance supported mainly
by the licensing provision of the SEL, rather than rule based su-
pervision supported by the SEL in full.'4 6
A key aspect of the SEL of 1948 was the creation of the Japa-
nese Securities and Exchange Commission ('jSEC") .147 The ini-
tial proposal by the Ministry for the JSEC focused on preserving
the Ministry's authority over the securities industry and gave the
142. See TATSUTA, supra note 85, at 11 (listing system of registration for securities,
broker dealers, and securities exchanges as feature of SEL).
143. See Akashi, supra note 20, at 1297-1301 (comparing effectiveness of SEL with
U.S. securities laws); Harvey L. Pitt & David B. Hardison, Games Without Frontiers: Trends
in the International Response to Insider Trading, 55-AUT LAW 8 CONTEMP. PROBS. 199, 219
(1992) (stating that Ministry "has traditionally been viewed as champion of Japanese
securities firms rather than as a public watchdog.").
144. See Shen-Shin Lu, Are the 1988 Amendments to Japanese Securities Regulation Law
Effective Deterrents to Insider Trading?, 1991 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 179, 181-82 (1991) (stat-
ing that Japanese felt that SCAP had implemented too many "overreaching occupa-
tional provisions"); see also Milhaupt, supra note 6, at 432 (stating that "SEL represented
a wholesale importation of a securities regulation framework developed in a vastly dif-
ferent economic and political environment").
145. See Pitt & Hardison, supra note 143, at 216 (setting forth that insider trading
in Japan has long been tolerated). See, e.g., Milhaupt, supra note 6, at 439 (explaining
use of insider trading in Japan as part of regular course of business). Traditionally,
institutional investors controlled the majority of the market and relied on long term
relationships and exchange of information to monitor their investments. Milhaupt,
supra; see also Char, supra note 4, at 180 (stating that "[i]t is widely known that when a
Japanese company is preparing to issue new securities at market price, its underwriters
will often collude to artificially raise the market price of the issue in order to allow the
issuer to raise funds at a more favorable price and lower overall cost.").
146. See Yazawa, supra note 126, at 28 (discussing creation of licensing require-
ment for broker dealers and underwriters in 1938).
147. See Milhaupt, supra note 6, at 432 (assessing original regulator of Japan's se-
curities industry under SEL).
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JSEC limited powers.48 SCAP -ejected this plan because SCAP
wanted to create an independent organization similar to the Se-
curities and Exchange Commission.' 49 SCAP initially proved
successful when the Diet formed the JSEC independent of the
Ministry.'5 ° This formation imputed the JSEC with full authority
as a securities regulator as well as with the responsibility to pro-
mulgate and to amend regulations. 15' The Ministry, however,
proved victorious in the end with the abolition of the JSEC in
1952.152
During this same period, the Diet removed Article 163 53
from the Securities and Exchange Law.1 54 The Japanese govern-
ment designed Article 163 to be used in conjunction with Article
164155 to prevent short-swing trading by insiders. 156 Article 163
set forth an important disclosure requirement that obligated in-
siders to disclose their stock holdings and to report changes
therein to the government. 57 Article 164 required a director or
principle shareholder of a corporation to disgorge to the corpo-
ration profits resulting from certain types of short-swing trad-
ing. 158 The repeal of Article 163 in 1953 significantly weakened
the effectiveness of Article 164.159 The Ministry removed Article
148. See id. (discussing Ministry's input in creation of Japans Securities and Ex-
change Commission ('ISEC")).
149. See Tatsuta, supra note 85, at 10 (describing SCAPs' vision ofJapanese regula-
tor of securities industry was to have regulator similar to SEC).
150. Milhaupt, supra note 6, at 433.
151. Id.
152. See IsAAcs & EJIRI, supra note 10, at 2 (explaining that after JSEC's abolition
Ministry created new advisory board called Securities and Exchange Counsil to investi-
gate and determine important matters concerning securities transactions); see also
Milhaupt, supra note 6, at 433 (quoting Japanese government as stating JSEC "need-
lessly complicating matters in the name of economic democracy").
153. SEL, supra note 12, art. 163.
154. See Shen-Shin Lu, supra note 144, at 190 (describing that Japanese govern-
ment removed Article 163 of SEL because Ministry deemed it ineffective and too bur-
densome); see also Parker, supra note 63, at 1403 n.23 (noting recodification of SEL by
Securities Fairness Law of 1992 ("SFL")). The SFL recodified SEL art. 188 to SEL art.
163. Parker, supra. Also, the SFL recodified SEL art. 189 to SEL art. 164. Id. In addi-
tion, the SFL recodified SEL art. 58 to SEL art. 157. Id.
155. SEL, supra note 12, art. 164.
156. See Shen-Shin Lu, supra note 144, at 190-91 (detailing that without Article 163
of SEL reporting duty under Article 164 was useless as preventative to insider trading).
Article 164 was modeled after Section 16(b) of the 1934 Act. Id.
157. SEL, supra note 12, art. 163.
158. Id. art. 164.
159. See Akashi, supra note 20, at 1300 (stating that removal of Article 163 from
SEL leftJapanese regulators without effective means of monitoring trades by insiders).
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163 because the Ministry was ill-equipped to handle all of the
disclosures.16
The Japanese government also weakened the effectiveness
of the SEL by ignoring the benefits of Article 157 of the SEL. 16 1
The Japanese government modeled Article 157 after Rule lOb-
5162 of the 1934 Act.1 6 In the United States, the courts interpret
Rule 10b-5 as a general anti-fraud provision combating many
types of insider trading and market manipulation.164 In fact,
Rule lOb-5 forms an extremely effective weapon for the U.S. Se-
curities and Exchange Commission. 16 5 The Ministry, however,
refused to enforce Article 157 on the theory that it could not be
strictly construed to cover insider trading. 166
Another important modification of the SEL is the imple-
160. See Parker, supra note 63, at 1408 (highlighting Ministry's dissatisfaction with
Article 163 because Ministry was not equipped to deal with large volume of information
submitted in compliance with Article 163).
161. See id. (stating that Ministry's "non-use of Article [157] has proven even more
detrimental to insider trading regulation than the removal of Article [163] andJSEC.").
Article 157 sets forth in pertinent part:
No person shall commit any act set forth in the following Items:
To employ any fraudulent device, scheme or artifice with respect to buying,
selling or other transactions of securities;
(1) To obtain money or other property by using documents or any other rep-
resentation which contains an untrue statement of a material fact or omits
to state a material fact necessary to make the statement therein misleading
with respect to buying selling or other transactions of securities:
(2) To make use of any false quotation for the purpose of soliciting buying,
selling or other transactions of securities ....
SEL, supra note 12, art. 157.
162. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
163. See Shin-Shen Lu, supra note 144, at 186 (stating that "Article [157] was a
copy of Rule 10b-5 of the American Securities Exchange Act of 1934.").
164. Parker, supra note 63, at 1405 (describing Rule 10(b) as tool against market
manipulation); see also Shin-Shen Lu, supra note 144, at 186 (stating Rule 10b-5 is all
purpose fraud provision for securities regulations).
165. Parker, supra note 63, at 1409.
166. See Akashi, supra note 20, at 1298 (discussing reasons for Ministry's reluctance
to enforce Article 157 because Article 157 was too vague to be enforced); see also Shen-
Shin Lu, supra note 9, at 132 (outlining prosecutors reluctance to prosecute Article 157
violations because of difficulty in winning Article 157 cases). In the Japanese judicial
system, a prosecutor must prove the defendant's intention to commit the crime and the
definite cause and effect of the crime. Shen-Shin Lu, supra. Once a defendant is prose-
cuted, a guilty decision is expected. Id. If a prosecutor accumulates too many not
guilty judgments, the prosecutor will be deemed incompetent. Id. Because Article 157
is vague as to what constitutes a violation, prosecutors are reluctant to use it for fear that
failure will hurt their reputations. Id.
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mentation of a licensing system for securities companies.' 67 The
licensing system requires the Ministry to look at a number of
standards in order to allow a company to deal in securities. 161
For example, the applicant company must have sufficient finan-
cial status to enter the business.1 69 Also, the applicant company
must have sufficient knowledge and experience.17 0  Moreover,
the proposed business must be necessary and appropriate in
light of market needs. 17 1 Originally, the Japanese government
justified the implementation of the licensing system as improv-
ing the economic health of the securities industry by withhold-
ing licenses from weak firms. 1 7 2 In practice, however, the licens-
ing system has come to define the Ministry's method of regulat-
ing the securities industry in Japan.' 73
C. Modern Day Scandals and Reforms
Recent scandals form a final influential factor shaping the
Japanese securities market. 174 The interaction between the Min-
istry and the securities companies created an environment ripe
for such scandals.' 75 In turn, these recent scandals resulted in
further reform to the Japanese securities regulatory structure.
7 6
167. See Milhaupt, supra note 6, at 150 (stating that licensing system has important
effect on Ministry's regulatory style and on Japanese securities industry).
168. See TATSUTA, supra note 85, at 69-70 (summarizing standards promulgated by
Ministry that companies must meet to obtain their licenses as financial requirement,
experience requirement, and necessity of business requirement).
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. See Milhaupt, supra note 6, at 450-52 (outlining creation of licensing system to
improve financial soundness of securities industry).
173. See id. at 450 (stating that Ministry used licensing system as powerful tool in
regulating securities industry by getting securities companies to act by threatening to
deny licenses to securities companies to enter new lines of business or by granting per-
mission to market new products); see also TATSUTA, supra note 85, at 70-71 (stating that
criteria for granting licenses are considerably abstract and flexible to allow Ministry
broad discretion).
174. See Shen-shin Lu, supra note 9, at 131-49 (describing amendments to SEL
dealing with insider trading and compensating losses because of Tateho Chemical In-
dustries and Loss Compensation scandals).
175. See id. (analyzing cause of Tateho Chemical Industries and Loss Compensa-
tion scandals that show that disregard of securities laws by industry and Ministry caused
scandals).
176. See id. (describing Tateho Chemical Industries scandal and Loss Compensa-
tion scandal and ensuing reforms).
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1. Scandals
The Ministry's regulatory style over the securities industry
created an environment conducive to corruption.'77 The exten-
sive intermingling of Ministry officials with industry employees
created many opportunities for malfeasance. 7 ' Additionally,
the lack ofjudicial oversight. precluded any meaningful check on
the Ministry's actions. 79
a. Tateho Chemical Industries
Tateho Chemical Industries was a small, publicly-listed man-
ufacturer of insulating materials and electrofused magnesia for
electric heaters. 8 ° In August 1988, Tateho incurred a loss of Y24
billion (US$200 million) against a capitalization of Y2.5 million
(US$210,000) in the bond futures market.' During the weeks
before Tateho announced the loss, numerous insiders unloaded
over 20,000 shares.1 12 Additionally, Hanshin Sogo Bank, one of
the eight banks with which Tateho did business, sold 337,000
shares on the day before the announcement. 18 3 Commentators
reported that Hanshin possibly obtained prior knowledge of
Tateho's loss because of a conference held between Tateho and
all of its bankers the day before Tateho announced its lOSS.
18 4
After the incident, the Osaka Stock Exchange' 85 conducted an
177. See Choy, supra note 7, at 3 (explaining that collusion between Ministry and
securities companies led to corruption).
178. Id.
179. SeeYoung, supra note 26, at 954 (discussing impact of lack ofjudicial review of
administrative guidance).
180. See Islcs & EjiRi, supra note 10, at 135 (describing background of Tateho
Chemical Industries in detailing Japan's history of insider trading).
181. Shen-Shin Lu, supra note 9, at 130; see also Chance, supra note 21, at 196
(detailing how Tateho Chemical Industries lost money engaging in practice of Zai-tech,
which is practice of Japanese companies using their cash surplus to trade in securities
markets in effort to generate additional profits).
182. See Shen-Shin Lu, supra note 9, at 130 (listing insiders who sold shares of
Tateho Chemical Industries before announcement of loss to public).
183. See id. (describing sale by Hanshin Sogo Bank of its holdings of Tateho Chem-
ical Industries).
184. See id. (stating that Japanese government did not prove that Hanshin Sogo
Bank used insider information but there were "strong suspicions to the contrary").
185. See Ichiro Kawamoto, Regulation of Exchange Markets, in JAPANESE SECURITIES
REGULATION 108 (Louis Loss et al. eds., 1983) (detailing Japan's eight securities ex-
changes). The securities exchanges are located in Tokyo, Osaka, Nagoya, Kyoto, Fuku-
oka, Hiroshima, Niigata,. and Sapporo. Id. Securities exchanges in Japan must be li-
censed with the Ministry to operate. Id. These exchanges have regulatory power over
1998]
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investigation and reported that none of the sales of stock preced-
ing the announcement involved confidential information.186
b. The Loss Compensation Scandals
In 1991, the press revealed that Japan's major securities
companies compensated clients for losses incurred as a result of
trading.'8 7 In total, seventeen securities companies paid more
than Y171 billion (US$1.1 billion) to 608 organizations and nine
individuals. 8 Prior to this scandal, the business community
knew that securities firms were compensating their best custom-
ers for losses.' 89 In fact, after a similar scandal in 1989 involving
Daiwa Securities, the Ministry issued a circular stating that secur-
ities firms should refrain compensating clients for losses in-
curred.' 90 By compensating their best customers for losses, se-
curities companies developed and maintained lucrative under-
the securities companies, but that power is checked by the Ministry. Id. at 109. For
example, before listing a company, an exchange must first obtain approval from the
Ministry. Id. at 110-11. Similarly, before an exchange can de-list a company, it must
first gain the approval of the Ministry. Id. at 111.
186. Shen-Shin Lu, supra note 9, at 238 n.65. The Osaka Stock Exchange stated
that:
The Osaka Stock Exchange has made every effort to investigate the true facts
related to the possibility of insider trading of Tateho stock. According to our
investigation, there is no evidence of insider trading. But we found trading
which might cause misunderstanding. We feel sorry about this incident, since
it came right after our notification to all listed companies to monitor insider
trading. We strongly point out that insider trading is unfair and damages in-
vestor's confidence in securities markets. Triggered by this incident, we want
to make every effort to prevent the misuse of confidential information by in-
sider trading, and to protect the trustworthiness of the trading markets. We
also hope listed companies, securities firms, and related persons will prevent
insider trading.
Id.
187. See Milhaupt, supra note 6, at 460 (describing disclosure of Loss Compensa-
tion scandal by press in June of 1991).
188. See Securities Scandal Tops the Diet Agenda, MOF Working to Save Scarred Reputa-
tion, INT'L SEC. REG. REP., Aug. 13, 1990, at 8 (outlining breadth of scandal by stating
dollar amount that securities companies paid clients in compensation for market losses
incurred by clients).
189. See Char, supra note 4, at 175 (stating that public was well aware of securities
companies compensating important customers for trading losses); see also Milhaupt,
supra note 6, at 462 (setting forth public's knowledge of securities companies protect-
ing clients against market fluctuations).
190. See Char, supra note 4, at 177 (discussing Ministry's issuance of circular follow-
ing Daiwa Securities' admission of loss compensation in 1989); see also Milhaupt, supra
note 6, at 461 (pointing out that Daiwa paid out Y10 billion (US$77 million) to custom-
ers).
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writing, brokerage, and fund management business." 1
At the time of the 1991 scandal, Article 50192 of the SEL
prohibited only the promise of payment as part of a solicitation
of an investment transaction, but not the payment of loss com-
pensation. 93 A company could still compensate clients for
losses if there was no agreement prior to the transaction.19 4 Loss
compensation, however, contravened a Ministry circular prohib-
iting, such practice regardless of the existence of a prior prom-
ise. 95 Both the securities companies and the Ministry ignored
the circular, which, consequently, had little effect in preventing
loss compensation payments. In fact, some reports indicate that
the Ministry ignored the loss compensation payments by the se-
curities companies for approximately one year.1 96 Furthermore,
the Big Four firms revealed that the Ministry had occasionally
pressured securities companies to compensate major clients for
trading losses. 19
7
c. The Failure of a Member of the Big Four
On November 24, 1997, Yamaichi Securities Co., one of Ja-
pan's largest securities companies, announced its closing.'98 A
leading cause of the failure is that more than Y200 billion
(US$1.6 billion) in losses were previously undisclosed.1 99 A for-
191. See Char, supra note 4, at 178 (describing securities companies compensating
best customers to maintain positive working relationship with best customers).
192. SEL, supra note 12, art. 50.
193. Id.
194. See Nicole J. Ramsay, Japanese Securities Regulation: Problems of Enforcement, 60
FORDHAm L. REv. S255, S273 (1992) (describing limitation of Article 50 in preventing
compensation of losses).
195. Ministry of Finance Circular Directive No. 2150 (1989) Uapan); see Char,
supra note 4, at 177 (describing prohibitions to securities companies compensating
losses of clients).
196. See Nickerson, Japan Feeling Backlash From Stock Scandal, BOSTON GLOBE, June
30, 1991, at 65 (reporting that Ministry knew of securities companies' practice of com-
pensating clients approximately one year before media exposed scandal).
197. See Keehn, supra note 11, at 323 (explaining that President of Nomura Securi-
ties argued that Ministry informally approved payment of loss compensation to clients
as way to keep Tokyo market buoyant during bubble economy and its early aftermath);
see also Duck, supra note 4, at 1722 (stating that one result of Loss Compensation scan-
dal was resignation of Minister of Finance); Milhaupt, supra note 4, at 468 (designating
Minister of Finance at time of scandal as Ryutaro Hashimoto).
198. Douglas Ostrom, Yamaichi Securities'Failure Underscores Japan's Financial Fagility
JEl REPORT, Dec. 5, 1997, at 1.
199. See Hamilton & Spindle, supra note 104 (listing major undisclosed losses as
primary factor in closing of Yamaichi); see also Ostrom, supra note 198, at 1-2 (stating
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mer head of the Securities Bureau of the Ministry testified in
front of the Diet that Yamaichi attributed customers' losses to a
third entity to improve the appearance of business results.2 °°
The press also reported that Yamaichi later covered these losses
for the client and moved them to an overseas unit.201 The Minis-
try official further testified that he knew about the huge losses of
Yamaichi in 1991. 2 02 The official's testimony indicates that de-
spite knowing about the losses, he did nothing to ensure that
Yamaichi properly settled the losses.20 1 When the Diet asked
whether action by the Ministry could have helped avoid the fail-
ure of Yamaichi, the official testified affirmatively.2 4
d. MoF-Tan
In January 1998, the Tokyo Prosecutor's Office raided the
Ministry's headquarters for the first time in fifty years.20 5 The
scandal concerned the practice of the MoF-Tans bribing Ministry
officials to get information from bank examiners. 20 6 One bank
examiner allegedly received lavish dinners and a loan to
purchase a bank-owned apartment at a discounted price.20 7 In
return, this examiner allegedly warned the two banks of future
inspections and helped bank officials conceal an improper
loan.20 8 Allegedly, another examiner also received over Y2.2 mil-
lion (US$18,300) in entertainment bribes for informing one
that additional reasons for failure as falloff in business as consequence for corporate
extortionist scandal, weak stock market, and prospect of deregulation of stock commis-
sions).
200. See Norihiko Shirouzu, Ex-Regulator Knew of Losses at Yamaichi, WALL ST. J.,
Feb. 5, 1998, at A17.
201. See id. (describing practice of Yamaichi of moving accounts overseas to pre-
vent detection).
202. See id. (reporting that head of Securities Bureau testified that he remembered
being consulted by Yamaichi executive in 1991 about dispute between Yamaichi and
corporate over losses client incurred).
203. See id. (reporting that Securities Bureau head testified as to Ministry's inac-
tion after learning of Yamaichi hiding losses).
204. See id. (reporting that Securities Bureau head testified as to whether prior
intervention by Ministry would assist Yamaichi).
205. See Wanner, supra note 7, at 1, 8-9 (outlining argument that Prime Minister
Hashimoto and his cabinet convinced Prosecutor's office to raid Ministry in order to
weaken Ministry's power so that Ministry is less able to fight reforms).
206. SeeYokota, supra note 124, at 3 (reporting scandal involving bank officials and
government inspectors).
207. Wanner, supra note 7, at 3.
208. Id.
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bank of the inspection schedule and for releasing proprietary
information of another bank.2°9 The scandal caused the resigna-
tions of Finance Minister Hiroshi Mitsuzuka and Administrative
Vice Minister Takeshi Komura, the arrest of two examiners, and
the suicide of a third examiner suspected of receiving bribes.2 °
2. Regulatory Reforms
The scandals of the Japanese securities industry soon re-
sulted in the imposition of a number of regulatory reforms.21
One type of reform involves structural changes to the Ministry's
supervisory authority over the industry. 2  The other type of re-
form strengthens the SEL's powers.213
a. Structural
The Japanese government established the Securities and Ex-
change Surveillance Commission ("SESC") to ensure fairness in
the securities markets and thus rebuild investor confidence after
the Loss Compensation scandal. 2 4 The SESC began with a staff
of 202 people 5.2 1  The design for the SESC, however, only al-
lowed for twelve staff members for market surveillance and
twenty-six for inspections 6.2 1  The staff of thirty-eight retained re-
sponsibility for tracking the operation of 265 securities firms
with about 3,000 branches and approximately 153,000 employ-
ees.21 7 The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, by com-
parison, employed 2,600 staffers, 800 of whom performed sur-
209. Id.
210. See Makoto Sato, Finance Ministry Reeling From Attack, NirjEi WKLv., Feb. 2,
1998, at 1 (reporting that Ministry investigated both bank examiners in 1995 but did
not find any serious misconduct). The Secretariat Director, Toshiro, later apologized
for a loose investigation of the examiners. Id.
211. See Shen-Shin Lu, supra note 9, at 13145 (discussing reforms implemented
after Tateho Chemical Industries scandal to SEL to prevent insider trading); Char,
supra note 4, at 194-200 (outlining reform measures taken after Loss Compensation
scandal to SEL to prevent loss compensation payments in securities transactions).
212. See Char, supra note 4, at 194-200 (explaining creation of Securities and Ex-
change Surveillance Commission ("SESC") as structural change to regulation of securi-
ties industry).
213. See Shen-Shin Lu, supra note 9, at 131-45 (detailing amendments to SEL after
Tateho Chemical Industries scandal to prevent insider trading).
214. See Chance, supra note 21, at 190 (detailing impetus of Japanese government
creating SESC as to rebuild confidence of public in securities markets).
215. Keehn, supra note 11, at 326.
216. Id.
217. Id.
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veillance and inspections. 8
The SESC powers include conducting investigations of un-
lawful conduct that undermines the fairness of the securities
markets, 210 including the power to search offices for evidence as
well as to inspect the records of registered broker-dealers.22 °
The SESC is not authorized, however, to bring its own enforce-
ment actions. 22 1 When the SESC finds a violation, it has the op-
tion of making a formal accusation to the public prosecutor's
office or of making a recommendation that the Finance Minister
bring sanctions against the offender.22 After receiving a recom-
mendation from the SESC on enforcement, the Minister of Fi-
nance must respect such recommendations. 2 '3  The Minister,
however, is not required by law to act on the recommenda-
tions.22 4 In addition, the law establishing the SESC allows the
Ministry to carry out the same tasks as the SESC. 225 This overlap
in powers results in the SESC following the Ministry through in-
vestigations to prevent duplicative efforts.226
The establishment of the SESC followed a path similar to
the establishment of the JSEC fifty years earlier. 227 The Ad Hoc
Council on the Promotion of Administrative Reform 228 origi-
nally called for an independent agency to regulate the securities
markets. 229 The Ministry, however, chose to maintain its author-
218. See id. (comparing resources of SESC to those of SEC).
219. See Milhaupt, supra note 6, at 470 (detailing authority of SESC to conduct
investigations into securities malfeasance).
220. See Char, supra, note 4, at 199 (describing powers of SESC as including ability
to enter securities companies as part of investigatory authority).
221. Id.
222. See Milhaupt, supra note 6, at 471 (setting forth process for SESC to institute
action against miscreants in Japan's securities industry as involving recommendations to
public prosecutors office or Ministry but not having ability to take independent action).
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. See Keehn, supra note 11, at 326 (stating that Ministry made sure that SESC
establishment law allowed Ministry to possess same investigatory authority).
226. See id. (explaining that Ministry's ability to possess same investigatory author-
ity as SESC meant that SESC followed lead of Ministry in investigations).
227. See Milhaupt, supra note 6, at 432-33 (comparing creation of SESC with crea-
tion of JSEC in 1948 by stating that both times Ministry struggled to prevent losing its
power to independent agency).
228. See id. (explaining that Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu directed Ad Hoc Council
to undertake consideration of reform measures after Loss Compensation scandal, in-
cluding establishment of securities market oversight agency).
229. See Keehn, supra note 11, at 325 (explaining Council was quasi-official govern-
mental body that recommended that SESC be created independent of Ministry).
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ity over the SESC.23° The Ministry stated that an independent
agency was not necessary because the licensing system could bet-
ter monitor the securities companies.2"' The Ministry also stated
that an independent agency would not work because of its isola-
tion from the information and authority accruing to the Ministry
under the licensing system.232
After the launching of the SESC, commentators spoke of its
weakness. 233  One commentator observed that the SESC will
have a position similar to an inside council that can observe and
make recommendations, but does not have power to affect the
securities market.234 Another commentator has stated that the
creation of the SESC was a superficial attempt at reforming se-
curities regulation. 2 5
b. Statutory Reforms
The Japanese government also instituted statutory reforms
to the SEL as a result of several scandals.236 One of these re-
forms aims to prevent future insider trading from occurring. 237
Another statutory reform prohibits loss compensation. 23 "
i. Insider Trading Reforms
The inclusion of Articles 16623' and 167240 in the SEL in
230. Id. at 322-25.
231. See Milhaupt, supra note 6, at 467 (detailing that head of Securities Bureaus
explained that Japanese licensing system limits number of securities firms entering in-
dustry and prevents easy exit, thus diminishing need for SEC style agency).
232. Id.
233. Keehn, supra note 11, at 322.
234. See Shen-Shin Lu, supra note 9, at 148 (stating that "[t]his new watchdog,
which is under the aegis of the [Ministry] and has a position similar to an inside coun-
cil, observes, investigates, and reports, but it does not have the teeth to bite into the
securities market.").
235. See Keehn, supra note 11, at 322 (stating that "the creation of the SESC
turned out to be a textbook example of how reformist sentiments can be systematically
short-circuited by the entrenched power of the bureaucracy").
236. See Shen-Shin Lu, supra note 9, at 131-45 (discussing reforms to SEL to pre-
vent insider trading as result of Tateho Chemical Industries scandal); Char, supra note
4, at 194-200 (outlining amendments to SEL to prevent payment of compensation by
securities companies to customers for losses incurred by customers in securities mar-
kets).
237. Shen-Shin Lu, supra note 9, at 13145.
238. Char, supra note 4, at 194-200
239. SEL, supra note 12, art. 166. Article 166 defines corporate insiders as:
(1) The officers, agents, employees and other persons who are engaged in the
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1988 formed a major part of the reform after the Tateho scan-
dal. 241 By including Articles 166 and 167 in the SEL, the Japa-
nese government definitively prohibits insider trading and thus
clears up the vagueness caused by Article 157.242 Article 166 pro-
hibits insider trading by a corporate insider,243 while Article 167
prohibits insider trading in connection with tender offers.24 4 A
violation of Article 166 occurs when an insider obtains know-
ledge of an important fact relating to the business of a listed
corporation 245 and then buys or sells securities of that corpora-
business of the corporation when they acquire the knowledge in connec-
tion with the performance of their duties;
(2) The shareholders or ordinary investors provided in the Preferred Capital
Contribution Law who are prescribed by Ministerial Ordinance as those
similar shareholders who have the right provided in Paragraph 1 of the
Commercial Code . .. when they acquire the knowledge in connection
with the exercise of such right;
(3) Any person who has the power over the corporation based on a statute...
when he acquires the knowledge in connection with the exercise of such
power;
(4) Any person who has a contractual relationship with the corporation ...
when he acquires the knowledge in connection with entering into or per-
forming the contract.
Id.
240. Id. art. 167.
241. See Shen-Shin Lu, supra note 144, at 209 (outlining addition of Articles 166
and 167 to SEL to prevent insider trading).
242. See id. (stating that because Article 157 is too vague to be used in insider
trading cases, Japanese government needed to clarify concept of insider trading to
make it illegal and thus amended SEL to include Articles 166 and 167).
243. SEL, supra note 12, art. 166.
244. Id. art. 167.
245. Id. art. 166. An important fact is defined as:
(1) The fact that the executive organ of the subject listed corporation, etc. has
made the decision to perform any of the following matters or made the
decision not to perform an such matter... :
A. the issue of shares of stock, convertible bonds or bonds with subscrip-
tion rights to shares;
B. the reduction of capital;
C. acquisition by the corporation of its own shares of stock pursuant to
the provisions . .
D. the stock split;
E. the payment of dividends or profit or surplus or the distribution of
cash in the course of a business period ... ;
F. the merger or consolidation of the corporation;
G. the transfer of the whole or a part of the business or enterprise of the
corporation or the transfer of the whole or a part of the business or
enterprise of another corporation;
H. dissolution of a corporation... ;
I. the commercialization of a new product...
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tion before the information is released to the public. 246 A viola-
tion of Article 167 occurs when an insider obtains information
regarding the execution or cancellation of a tender offer and
then buys shares or options of a company involved before that
information is known to the public.247 Both articles apply the
prohibition of insider trading to "tippees. "248 The articles pro-
hibit any person who has been informed of an important fact by
a person related to the corporation to trade on that informa-
tion. 2 49
The inclusion of Article 163250 in the SEL also resulted from
the Tateho scandal.2 '1 Article 163 requires corporate officers
with more than ten percent of issued shares to file a report to
the Ministry following their purchase or sale of any corporate
shares.252 The reinstatement of Article 163 into the SEL means
that Article 164 serves as a more effective tool to prevent short-
swing profits by insiders. 53 Pursuant to Article 164, when the
Ministry determines that a short swing violation occurred, it
sends the information to the corporation, after giving the insider
an opportunity to deny the allegations. 254 At that point, either
(2) The happening of any of the following events:
A. damages caused by calamity or business;
B. a change in any principal shareholder;
C. an event which will give rise to de-listing or cancellation of registration
of specified securities... ;
D. any other matters prescribed by Cabinet Order...
(4) The existence of a difference between the forecast amount of sales, ordi-
nary profit or net income of the subject listed corporation, etc. which it
has newly calculated or any such amount contained in its final accounts
for the relevant period and any such amount which the corporation has
published in its most recent forecast ....
Id.
246. Id. art. 166.
247. Id. art. 167.
248. See Shen-Shin Lu, supra note 144, at 211 (defining "tippee" as "[any person
who receives an issuer's business' material facts directly from the corporate-related par-
ties.").
249. SEL, supra note 12, arts. 166(3), 167(4).
250. Id. art. 163.
251. Shen-Shin Lu, supra note 144, at 203.
252. Id.
253. SEL, supra note 12, art. 164. Preventing short swing trading refers to review-
ing any profits gained "by a purchase after six months of a sale or a sale after six months
of a purchase" to determine if there is any "unfair use of secret information" by a corpo-
rate insider. SEL, supra; see Shin-Shen Lu, supra note 144, at 203 (explaining that inclu-
sion of Article 163 acts to provide strength for Article 164).
254. See Shen-Shin Lu, supra note 144, at 203 (describing role of Ministry in
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the corporation takes action, or the information becomes public
so that the shareholders may take action. 255
ii. Loss Compensation
The Loss Compensation Scandal resulted in the broadening
of Article 50256 of the SEL to cover all forms of compensation. 257
The amendment includes punishment for not only the securities
companies that compensate clients for investment losses, but
also for the recipients of these types of payments.258 This new
law makes loss compensation a criminal offense and the punish-
ment includes possible jail time and monetary penalties. 259
II. NEW REFORMS FOR OLD WEAKNESSES
The Japanese government recently began another cycle of
reforms to improve the regulation of the securities industry.2 6 °
Prime Minister Hashimoto initiated this reform process, known
as the Big Bang, in 1996.261 Hashimoto, however, no longer
oversees the reform process because of his resignation in July
1998.262
A. The Big Bang
The Big Bang reform process arose out of Prime Minister
Hashimoto's vision for Japan.26" He initiated the reforms to en-
sure Japan's economic vitality. 26 4 A major part of the reforms
preventing short swing trading by using authority of Article 163 to gather information
and 164 to disclose information to insiders' corporation or to public).
255. Id.
256. SEL, supra note 12, art. 50.
257. See Char, supra note 4, at 194-95 (describing amendments to SEL because of
Loss Compensation scandals that makes investment loss payback criminal offense that
carries penalties of up to one year in prison or a fine of up to V1 million (US$7,692).
258. SEL, supra note 12, art. 50.
259. Id.
260. See Ministry of Finance, The Main Steps Taken Leading up to the Big Bang (visited
Mar. 16, 1998) <http://www.mof.go.jp/english/big-bang/ebb6.htm> (on file with the
Fordham International Law Journal) [hereinafter Main Steps] (outlining major events of
Big Bang from its inception on November 11, 1996 to March 31, 1997).
261. Id.
262. See Barbara Wanner, Three Way Race for LDP President Sparks Debate, Maneuver-
ing, JEI REPORT, July 24, 1998, at 1 (reporting Prime Minister Hashimoto's resignation
July 13, 1998 to accept responsibility for huge LDP losses in Diet elections).
263. See Structural Reform, supra note 14 (outlining Prime Minister Hashimoto's
plans for Japan's economic future with ultimate goal of ensuring economic vitality).
264. Id.
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adversely affect the Ministry's ability to regulate the securities in-
dustry.26 5
1. Background
The Big Bang seeks to adhere to the principles of a free,
fair, and global market. 26 6 To achieve its goals, the Big Bang
looks to liberalize market entry, products, and prices.267 This re-
form process intends to clarify and to enhance the transparency
of rules and to protect investors' interests.268 The Big Bang also
includes plans to establish a legal system, accounting system, and
supervisory regime consistent with globalization. 26
Commentators report that the reform package has potential
to weaken the Ministry's power over the securities industry. 270
One threat to the Ministry is the removal of the Ministry's ability
to guide securities companies through licensing.27' Another
threat is the removal of the Ministry's authority for supervising
the industry.2 72 The Ministry, however, acted as advisor to the
Prime Minister on all of the financial reforms.2 73 The result of
this arrangement left the Ministry with the ability to determine
265. See Choy, supra note 7, at 15 (describing Ministry's loss of supervisory and
regulatory authority to new independent regulatory agency if reform proposals suc-
ceed).
266. See Structural Reform, supra note 14 (discussing Japanese government's plans to
implement capitalist ideals to their securities regulation system).
267. Id.
268. Id. (detailing that government plans to promote entry by companies into se-
curities, banking, and insurance sectors and to expand activities in which securities
companies and banks can engage).
269. Id. (discussing Japanese government's plan to create transparent and credi-
ble market through disclosure of information necessary to establish own-risk principle
and clarification of rules and to promote active punishment for rule violations).
270. See Choy, supra note 7, at 15 (stating that under proposed reforms Ministry
will lose some of its supervisory and regulatory powers).
271. See id. at app. 1 (listing attempted abolishment of licensing requirement as
part of Financial Systems Reforms Bill ("FSRB")). The Diet enacted the FSRB on June
5, 1998 and it will go into effect on December 1, 1998. Id.
272. See Jon Choy, Hashimoto Fills Diet's Docket with Reforms, JEI REPORT, Mar. 21,
1997, at 4 (describing that purpose of FSA was to take over supervisory duties over
securities industry).
273. See Japan Puzzle, supra note 68, at 21 (stating that Ministry served as main
advisor to Hashimoto in creating and shaping reform package because Ministry was
"only institution capable of weighing competing ideas and formulating workable solu-
tions."). See generally, Main Steps, supra note 260 (detailing Prime Minister Hashimoto
issuing directions to Minister of Finance and Minister of Justice to engage in financial
system reform).
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what reforms to make while still ensuring its control over the
securities industry.274 The reforms process schedule for comple-
tion stretches over a five year period.275
Currently, the need for economic vitality is strong as Japan
is in its worst recession since World War 11.276 The recession
highlights a number of weaknesses in the Japanese economy.
27 7
According to observers, one weakness in Japan's economy is that
competition is subordinate to regulatory control.2 7 8 The Minis-
try controls not only the firms that enter the market but also the
firms corporate structures. 279 In addition, the Ministry controls
the types of products that could become available in Japan.28 °
Another weakness exposed by the recession, according to com-
mentators, is the level of collusion between regulators and finan-
cial institutions.281 Commentators once viewed this collusion as
the strength of the Japanese economy.28 2 The close working re-
lationship was hailed because of the ability of the private sector
to have a voice in regulation.28 3 Once the parties involved began
to act in their self interest as opposed to Japan's interest, how-
ever, the strength became a weakness.
28 4
274. See Japan Puzzle, supra note 68, at 21 (stating that "many people at the finance
ministry devoted most of their waking hours to thinking up ever more ingenious ways of
pandering to the prime minister's wishes, while at the same time ensuring that they
could hang on to their own particular piece of turf.").
275. See Structural Reform, supra note 14 (stating goal of reforms is to revitalize To-
kyo market by year 2001).
276. See Hashimoto's Curious Comeback, ECONOMIST, June 20, 1998, at 43 (reporting
June 12, 1998 statement by Japanese government's Economic Planning Agency that
Japan is in worst recession since World War II).
277. See Choy, supra note 7, at 1 (reporting that Japanese government and public
has realized thatJapan's financial markets, institutions, and regulations have significant
weaknesses).
278. See id. (reporting thatJapanese regulatory system came to be known as convoy
system whereby companies did not compete, but instead, moved together as quickly as
slowest could proceed). This system protected companies in the Japan market, but
exposed the entire industry to the competition of the world market. Id.
279. Id. at 2.
280. Id. at 1-2.
281. See id. at 2-3 (reporting collusion between regulators and financial institutions
as negative aspect of financial system and institutional practices).
282. See id. (describing collusion between Ministry and financial institutions as
benefit because it allowed private sector to present views to regulators and to vet poten-
tial policies or actions).
283. See Choy, supra note 7, at 3 (stating traditional perception of collusion be-
tween regulators and financial institutions).
284. Id.
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2. Elements of the Big Bang
The Big Bang's effects on the Ministry are two fold.285 The
reorganization of the supervisory duties from the Ministry to the
Prime Minister's office is one way the reforms affect the Minis-
try.286 The second effect is the planned substitution of the li-
censing system with a more open registration system.28 7
a. Reorganization of Supervisory Duties: The Financial
Supervision Agency
On June 22, 1998, the Financial Supervision Agency28
("FSA") began operation.2 9 The Diet charged the FSA with the
inspection and supervision of the securities industry, banks, in-
surers, some non-bank money lenders, and agricultural and la-
bor financial institutions. 290  The Japanese government also
plans for the FSA to fight money laundering and other interna-
tional financial crimes. 29' For securities supervision, the Diet re-
moved the SESC from the Ministry and placed it into the FSA.29 2
The Prime Minister's Office supervises the FSA.293
Masaharu Hino, who previously led the Nagoya High Public
Prosecutors Office, heads the new agency. 294 The head of the
FSA is required to cooperate with the ministers of the agencies
285. See Choy, supra note 272, at 4 (detailing duties of FSA, which will gain some
power over securities companies from Ministry); see also Choy, supra note 7 at app. 1
(outlining FSRB, which includes provisions that weaken Ministry's power by replacing
licensing system with registration system).
286. Choy, supra, note 272.
287. Choy, supra, note 7.
288. See Shino Yuasa, Japan's Financial Supervision Agency to Start Work on Monday,
AGENCE FRANcE-PPEsSE, June 21, 1998 (describing FSA opened on June 22, 1998, to
oversee financial institutions).
289. Id.
290. See Choy, supra note 272, at 4 (detailing wide authority of FSA over areas of
industry that Ministry did not supervise such as agricultural and labor financial institu-
tions that were previously supervised by Ministry of Agriculture, Forest and Fisheries
and Minister of Labor, respectively).
291. See, KYODo NEWS, supra note 54 (noting planned additional duties of FSA).
292. See Choy, supra note 272, at 4.
293. See KYODo NEWS, supra note 54.
294. Id.; see also Yuasa, supra note 288 (reporting head of FSA set forth new princi-
ples of FSA). The first principle is to create a fair and transparent financial oversight
board. Yuasa, supra. The second principle is to carry out strict and effective monitor-
ing. Id. The third principle is to facilitate the exchange of views with international
oversight entities. Id. The fourth principle is to improve expertise. Id. The fifth prin-
ciple is to coordinate inspection, monitoring and oversight measures. Id.
19981
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that have policy making authority over the supervised indus-
tries.29 5 Specifically, the head of the FSA must confer with the
Ministry if the FSA wants to close down a financial institution.
296
Furthermore, the Finance Ministry is still responsible for creat-
ing financial policies, including the budget and legislation for
the industry. 29 7
The Japanese government staffed the FSA with 403 mem-
bers to supervise the securities, banking, insurance and other fi-
nancial institutions.298 By comparison, in the United States
there are 3,000 staff members supervising the securities indus-
try2 " and another 8,000 inspectors supervising the banking in-
dustry."°° Three hundred and seventy-three of the 403 FSA staff
members are from the Ministry.3' 1 All of the staff members
transferred to the FSA, except for high ranking officials, are al-
lowed to return to the Ministry.30
2
b. Licensing
The Big Bang abolishes the licensing system and imple-
ments a more open registration system. 30 ' Firms wishing to
enter the market must only notify the Ministry after they buy and
sell shares. 0 4 Securities companies that conduct securities un-
295. Choy, supra note 272, at 5.
296. See Kvono NEWS, supra note 54 (noting that "there remains some murkiness
about its jurisdiction").
297. Choy, supra note 272, at 5.
298. KvoDo NEWS, supra note 54.
299. U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, GPRA Strategic Plan 3 (Sept. 1997)
(visited Aug. 31, 1998) <http://www.sec.gov/asec/gpra1197.htm> (on file with the Ford-
ham International Law Journal).
300. See Sandra Sugawara, In the Daiwa Bond Trading Case, A Regulatory World of
Difference, WAS!i. POST, Oct. 13, 1995, at D2 (reporting thatJapan has 1,000 banks com-
pared with 13,000 banks in United States).
301. Kvono NEWS, supra note 54.
302. Id.
303. See Choy, supra note 7, at app. 1 (outlining FSRB, which includes provisions
that reduce restrictions on entry into securities market and marketing of products by
securities companies); see atso The Securities and Exchange Counsil, Comprehensive Re-
form of the Securities Market: For a Rich and Diverse 21" Century June 13, 1997) (visited
March 16, 1998) § If, at 1, <http://www.mof.go.jp/english/tosin/ela505f4.htm> (on
file with the Fordham International Law Journal, (stating that "[p] reventative regulations
limiting activity and products should be repealed to the extent possible, and policies
should shift to one that builds up an environment in which market discipline operates
effectively.").
304. See Choy, supra note 7, at app. 1 (describing registration process envisioned in
Prime Minister's reforms).
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derwriting, over-the-counter securities derivatives trading, and
operate proprietary trading systems, however, must still request
approval from the Ministry 0 5
A similar reform concerns the diversification of securities
companies' services. °6 This reform requires only that the secur-
ities companies file notifications when engaging in product lines
clearly specified in laws and ordinances. °7 Ministry approval is
only needed for product lines that are not listed in the laws.3 ° If
the product line conflicts with the public interest30 9 or impairs
investor protection because of difficulties in calculating risks, it
will not receive approval from the Ministry.310 To facilitate this
proposal, the SEL will be amended to expand the definition of
securities.31 The definition of securities will be expanded to
cover all of the new types of products that securities companies
will be allowed to market.3 12 The SEL will also be amended to
enhance rules governing actions taken by securities compa-
nies.3 3 These amendments will include provisions to protect
against damage caused by conflicting interests among securities
companies and provisions to require greater disclosure from fi-
nancial intermediaries regarding their products.3 1 4
B. Changes In Power
The political environment surrounding the Big Bang has
changed since its inception in 1996.315 The first change is the
305. Id.; see also Ministry of Finance, About the Financial System Reform (The Japanese
version of the Big Bang) (visited Mar. 16, 1998) <http://www.mof.go.jp/english/big-
bang/ebbl.htm> (on file with the Fordham International Law Journal) [hereinafter About
the Financial System Reform] (describing proposals for review of licensing regime for se-
curities companies).
306. See Choy, supra note 7, at app. 1 (outlining FRSB provision to amend SEL
regarding diversification of securities companies services).
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. Id. (detailing FRSB provision to amend SEL regarding expansion of defini-
tion of securities).
312. Id.
313. Id. (outlining provisions of FSFB to amend SEL regarding building frame-
work that enables users to make transactions with confidence).
314. Id.
315. See Leaving It to the Old Man, ECONOMIST, Aug. 1, 1998, at 34 [hereinafter Old
Man] (describing election of Prime Minister Obuchi after resignation of Prime Minister
Hashimoto).
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transfer of power from Prime Minister Hashimoto to Prime Min-
ister Obuchi. 316 The second change is the withdrawal by the To-
kyo Prosecutors Office from investigating Ministry officials.317
1. Changes in Leadership
Although Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto initiated and
guided the latest reform process, 318 he resigned onJuly 13, 1998
to accept responsibility for the losses that his party, the Liberal
Democratic Party ("LDP"), incurred in the upper house elec-
tions the previous day. 19 Commentators report that the LDP
lost the seats because of the public's dissatisfaction with the way
the Japanese government was handling the economic crisis in
Japan.3 20
The LDP elected Keizo Obuchi 321 in place of Hashimoto on
July 30, 1998.322 Commentators opine that his election was the
result of strong support by LDP party boss Noboru Takeshita. 23
Takeshita held the position of Minister of Finance and then
Prime Minister of Japan, but resigned his post as Prime Minister
after it was disclosed that he was involved in a bribery scandal.324
316. Id.
317. See Tett, supra note 11 (reporting that Japanese government may be trying to
wind down its investigation into Ministry by transferring lead prosecutor to rural out-
post).
318. See About the Financial System Reform, supra note 305, at 1 (describing Prime
Minister's involvement of reform process as issuing directions to Minister of Finance
and Minister ofJustice to start financial system reform); see also Choy, supra note 272, at
4 (reporting Hashimoto submitting reform bills to Diet).
319. Choy, supra note 272, at 4.
320. See Barbara Wanner, Upper House Polls Shake Up Japanese Plolitics, But Outlook for
Change Remains Uncertain, JEI REPoRT, July 24, 1998, at 1 (setting forth public sentiment
concerning economy and recent Diet elections).
321. See Old Man, supra note 315, at 34 (reporting new Prime Minister Obuchi's
background as entering Diet in 1963 with support of Noboru Takeshita, LDP party boss,
then becoming cabinet secretary under Prime Minister Takeshita in 1987, then in 1992,
Takeshita made Obuchi head of Keiseikai, largest faction within LDP).
322. Id.
323. See id. at 34 (stating that Takeshita picked Obuchi because Takeshita wanted
"to call the shots again, and, above all, to get the LDP back to its old way of doing
things.").
324. See Shen-Shin Lu, supra note 9, at 150 (describing Recruit scandal as involving
large number of politicians and bureaucrats accepting bribes from Recruit magazine).
The bribes were made to the politicians and bureaucrats in order to prevent them from
changing the timing of Government recruiting of college graduates. Id. Recruit maga-
zine made bribes to politicians and bureaucrats in the form of confidential information
about the upcoming public offering of stock for one of Recruit magazine's subsidiaries
and the sale of that stock to politicians and bureaucrats before the company went pub-
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One of Prime Minister Obuchi's first acts was to appoint a new
Minister of Finance.3 25 The new Minister, Kiichi Miyazawa, was
also involved in the bribery scandals as Minister of Finance
under Prime Minister Takeshita.
3 26
2. Changes in Investigation
Another important change in Japan politics is the abandon-
ment of the investigation into Ministry officials accepting bribes
from MoF-Tans.127 The lead prosecutor of the investigation was
reassigned to the rural outpost of Toyama. 2s Moreover, the
force of seventy prosecutors that once stormed into the Minis-
try3 29 has been decreased to thirty.
330
III. THE BIG BANG WILL HAVE NO LASTING IMPACT ON
THE MINISTRY OF FINANCE
The chances of any significant changes coming from the Big
Bang reform process are slight. The ability of the Ministry to
effect the Japanese government's behavior helps to ensure that
much of the Ministry's power remains unchanged.33' In addi-
tion, the structure of the present changes compared to past re-
forms shows that the present reforms lack the requisite formali-
lic. Id. In all, 44 politicians bought the stock before Recruit magazine's subsidiary went
public in 1986, and sold it by 1988 for a total profit of Y730,000,000 (US$6 million). Id.
The scandal reached the highest of Government posts and included the Prime Minister
at the time, Noboru Takeshita, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Abe, the Minister of
Finance, Kiichi Miyazawa, and former Prime Minister Nakasone. Id. Although authori-
ties prosecuted 20 people for bribery, most of them served as company directors or
officers, not politicians. Id. Indeed, authorities prosecuted only six politicians and they
were congressmen and aids. Id. Most significantly, however, is that not one person
involved in the scandal was charged with any type of securities regulation violation. Id.
325. Old Man, supra note 315, at 34.
326. Id.
327. See Tett, supra note 11, at 18 (reporting abandonment of investigation into
financial institution corruption).
328. See Sheryl WuDunn, Japan's Corruption Fighter Is Shunted Aside, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
18, 1998, at DI (reporting that although Katsuhiko Kumazaki was not sole prosecutor
behind investigation into Ministry, he was to head of Tokyo Prosecutor's Office and his
transfer substantially ends investigation).
329. See Tett, supra note 11, at 18 (noting number of prosecutors that were in-
volved in investigation of Ministry as part of recent bribery scandal).
330. Id.
331. See supra notes 43-61 and accompanying text (setting forth Ministry's author-
ity within government by listing various bureaus of Ministry and authority of those bu-
reaus); supra notes 63-69 and accompanying text (detailing Ministry's ability to effect
behavior of Diet and Prime Minister by being primary advisor to both).
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ties to create any impact.3 32 Furthermore, the political changes
in Japan and Japan's historical tolerance of malfeasance in the
securities industry signify the likelihood that the reform process
will produce little meaningful change.333
A. The Ministry's Power Within the Government and Over the
Securities Industry Reduces the Likelihood of Meaningful Change
The likelihood that the Big Bang reforms will make signifi-
cant changes to securities regulation in Japan is low because
those changes will also weaken the power of the Ministry. His-
torically, the Ministry has been reluctant to relinquish power
over the securities industry and thus is unlikely to relinquish
that power through the present reform process. 334 The Ministry
controls sufficient power within the Japanese government and
over the securities industry to ensure that it can also control the
reform process.335
The Ministry's power ranges from drafting legislation and
controlling the budget to placing retired employees at securities
firms. 3 6 Specifically, the Ministry's budgetary power ensures its
ability to influence other government agencies, the LDP, and
the Prime Minister.3  This control limits the amount of
changes that the Japanese government can make to the Ministry.
Similarly, the Ministry's unique expertise in issues of securities
regulation 33  ensures the Ministry's control of legislative and re-
form drafting. In fact, the Ministry functioned as an integral
332. See supra notes 211-59 and accompanying text (outlining past attempts to re-
form both Ministry and SEL).
333. See supra notes 324-30 and accompanying text (arguing that change of leader-
ship and withdrawal of prosecution efforts against Ministry indicate retreat in reform
efforts).
334. See supra notes 147-52 and accompanying text (detailing creation of Japan's
independent securities regulator (JSEC) in 1948 and subsequent abolishment of regula-
tor and adoption of regulatory responsibilities by Ministry); supra notes 214-35 and ac-
companying text (explaining original desires for creation of SESC in 1992 as independ-
ent body and subsequent creation of SESC as part of Ministry).
335. See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text (outlining Ministry's authority
over securities industry).
336. See supra notes 43-124 and accompanying text (detailing Ministry's authority
over securities industry, including within government and over securities industry).
337. See supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text (setting forth amount of power
Ministry retains by controlling budget).
338. See supra note 68 and accompanying text (describing Ministry's ability to draft
legislation); supra note 273 and accompanying text (describing reliance of Prime Minis-
ter on Ministry when drafting reform proposals).
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participant in the creation of the present reform system."3 9
Thus, the Ministry could hold on to its power over the securities
industry while drafting the reforms.34 ° Additionally, the Ministry
maintains substantial control over the securities companies be-
cause of extensive intermingling between the Ministry and secur-
ities companies' employees. 4 This power enables the Ministry
to retain control over the securities industry even if the Japanese
government removes its supervisory duties.
B. The Structure of the Reforms Indicates a Low Likelihood of
Meaningful Change
An analysis of the structure of the reforms affecting regula-
tion of the securities industry indicates that the present reforms
will fail to produce meaningful change.342 One weakness in the
structure of the reforms concerns the proposals replacing the
licensing system with a registration system. The proposals only
allow securities companies to market products already listed in
the SEL as approved products.343 Thus, securities companies
must still gain permission to market products that are not in-
cluded in the SEL either from the Ministry or from the enact-
ment of a law amending the SEL to include the new type of
product. Similarly, securities companies can avoid the licensing
procedure to operate, but only if they do not engage in under-
writing, over-the-counter securities derivatives trading, or opera-
tion of proprietary trading systems.3" The majority of securities
companies, however, engage in these activities and thus will still
need to be licensed.
Also, a comparison to past attempts to create an independ-
339. See supra note 273 and accompanying text (discussing Ministry's involvement
in drafting of reforms).
340. See supra note 274 and accompanying text (outlining commentators' opinion
that Ministry's participation in creation of reforms ensured its ability to maintain power
over securities industry).
341. See supra notes 110-24 and accompanying text (detailing practices of
amakudari and MoF-Tan as exemplifying Ministry's extensive influence within securities
companies).
342. See supra notes 214-35 and accompanying text' (highlighting past reforms to
indicate that present reforms are an attempt to correct situation that past reforms could
not correct).
343. See supra note 307 and accompanying text (describing section of FSRB con-
cerning registration for securities products).
344. See supra note 305 and accompanying text (detailing section of FSRB concern-
ing registration of securities companies).
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ent securities regulator reveals the weaknesses in the new Finan-
cial Services Agency. The initial proposal for the creation of the
SESC in 1992 called for that agency to be independent of the
Ministry. 4 5 As a foreshadowing of the current reform measures,
the Ministry stated that the SESC could not operate indepen-
dently of the Ministry because the SESC did not have sufficient
authority.346 The Ministry was referring to the SESC's inability
to gain information and power because it would not have access
to the licensing system. Now, seven years later, the Japanese gov-
ernment has created a new agency that lacks that same authority.
Specifically, the Ministry will still retain control over part of the
licensing system. 47 In addition, the SESC was not empowered to
take action on its own when it found malfeasance in the securi-
ties industry.34 Similarly, the head of the FSA is required to co-
operate with the head of the Ministry before making a decision
that will greatly impact the securities industry.
Another weakness in the structure of the reforms is the lim-
ited staffing of the FSA. The Japanese government created the
FSA with a staff which is limited for its duties and which pales in
comparison to the SEC of the United States. The FSA is staffed
with 403 employees that are responsible for supervising the se-
curities industry, the banking industry, the insurance industry,
some nonbank money lenders, agricultural and labor financial
institutions.349 By comparison, in the United States, the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission employs 3,000 staff members to
supervise the securities industry and the various banking regula-
tors employ 8,000 inspectors to supervise the banking indus-
try.350 Also, a majority of the FSA employees can transfer back to
the Ministry. This ability is significant because, as the most elite
agency in the Japanese government, the Ministry is likely the
agency of choice for ambitious bureaucrats to work. Thus, these
345. See supra note 229 and accompanying text (describing attempt of Provisional
Counsil on Administrative Reform to remove SESC from Ministry authority).
346. See supra note 232 and accompanying text (stating Ministry's justification for
maintaining authority over SESC).
347. See supra notes 303-14 and accompanying text (outlining licensing reform
proposals that allow Ministry to retain power through licensing).
348. See supra note 221 and accompanying text (discussing limit on SESC's power
to bring action against securities companies).
349. See supra note 290 and accompanying text (outlining responsibility of FSA).
350. See supra notes 299-300 and accompanying text (stating number of employees
supervising both securities industry and banking industry).
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bureaucrats will tend to be sympathetic to the Ministry when
working for the FSA.
C. The Current Political Situation in Japan Reduces the Likelihood
that the Big Bang Will Succeed
The changing political situation in Japan indicates that the
reform process will not be as sweeping as originally planned. 51
Prime Minister Hashimoto proposed a restructuring of the regu-
lation of the securities market to bring meaningful reform to the
Japanese government.1 2 Hashimoto, however, can no longer
ensure that the reforms are implemented according to his vision
because of he resigned in July 1998. 5  Today, the task of ensur-
ing the removal of supervisory duties of the Ministry and replac-
ing the licensing system with a registration system falls to new
Prime Minister Obuchi.354
The reformation of securities regulation in Japan will slow
down because of this new development in Japanese politics.
Obuchi represents an older, more entrenched style of leader-
ship in Japan. Indeed, his main support in the LDP comes from
former Minister of Finance and Prime Minister Takeshita. 55
Commentators believe that Takeshita placed Obuchi in the
Prime Minister's office to move the LDP back to traditional ways
of operation.
Traditionally, Japan has not been adverse to securities mal-
feasance. Indeed, the Recruit scandal and the Tateho Chemical
Industries scandal proves that blatant malfeasance was not prose-
cuted. 356  The Loss Compensation scandal, the failure of
Yamaichi, and the current MoF-Tan scandal show that the Minis-
351. See supra notes 318-30 and accompanying text (outlining political change in
Japan).
352. See supra notes 260-69 and accompanying text (detailing vision of Prime Min-
ister Hashimoto for reform process).
353. See supra notes 262-320 and accompanying text (discussing resignation of
Hashimoto).
354. See supra note 315 and accompanying text (identifying Prime Minister Obuchi
as successor to Prime Minister Hashimoto).
355. See supra notes 315-23 and accompanying text (explaining Obuchi's election
as Prime Minister as caused by LDP party boss Takehita).
356. See supra note 324 and accompanying text (describing circumstances of Re-
cruit scandal including fact that no participant of scandal was prosecuted for securities
violations despite fact that scandal involved bribing of politicians with inside informa-
tion regarding initial public offering of stocks); supra notes 180-86 and accompanying
text (discussing fact that although Hanshin Sogo Bank sold large amount of stock of
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try even had a hand in the securities malfeasance, or at least
turned a blind eye toward the malfeasance. 57 Furthermore
three of the four political figures in the reform process were im-
plicated in scandals. Prime Minister Hashimoto resigned as Min-
ister of Finance after the Loss Compensation scandal. Nobura
Takeshita and Kiichi Miyazawa resigned as Prime Minister and
Minister of Finance after the Recruit scandal.
A final indication that the Japanese government may not
continue to reform the Ministry of Finance is the relaxation of
enforcement actions against the Ministry. The prosecutor lead-
ing the team investigating the Ministry was transferred to a rural
outpost, and his team of prosecutors was severely downsized. 358
The relaxation of enforcement actions against Ministry officials
contravening established laws makes it unlikely that there will be
new laws created that further reform the Ministry.
IV. CONCLUSION
If the Japanese government wishes to effect real reform on
the economy, then it must take more drastic steps. Isolating the
supervisory duties over the securities market from the Ministry
with the FSA represents a step in the right direction, but ulti-
mately will prove too small a step. To be effective, the new
agency must be vested with appropriate resources. Similarly, the
shift from licensing to registration will not suffice to create
meaningful reform. The Ministry still wields substantial power
with the reform proposals. The licensing system must be abol-
ished altogether and replaced with a registration system and the
FSA must be fully staffed and completely independent from the
Ministry for the reforms to be effective. Until full control of su-
pervision is taken from the Ministry, meaningful change will not
occur.
Tateho Chemical Industries after bank had private meeting with Tateho but before
Tateho announced huge operating losses to public no securities violation was found).
357. See supra notes 196-97 and accompanying text (examining that Ministry knew
of compensation payments by Big Four securities companies and even pressured securi-
ties companies to make compensation payments to support stock market); supra notes
200-04 and accompanying text (discussing knowledge of Ministry Bureau that Yamaichi
Securities was involved in improprieties with customer accounts and that Ministry inter-
vention may have prevented closing of Yamaichi Securities); supra notes 205-10 (outlin-
ing scandal involving financial institutions bribing Ministry officials).
358. See supra notes 327-30 and accompanying text (discussing abandonment of
investigation of Ministry).
